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MINORITIES AND DIVERSITIES: THE
"REMARKABLE EXPERIMENT"' OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
by Carol Weisbrod*
The State exists for the sake of Society, not Society for the
sake of the State.
Woodrow Wilson 2
INTRODUCTION
This paper considers some issues relating to state frameworks in-
tended to permit and encourage large diversities in societal group life.
It focuses illustratively on material relating to the period after the First
World War, when the League of Nations used a system of treaties to
protect the ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities of certain largely
central European states, and suggests that in thinking about issues of
minorities we must also think about our definitions of the state. Educa-
tion, because it is of such importance to individuals, groups and the
state, is used as a field through which a pluralist framework for diver-
sity is explored.
The paper discusses a mix of international and domestic questions,
on the theory that in a certain way they are similar. The basic situation
* Carol Weisbrod is Ellen Ash Peters Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School
of Law.
This paper was given at the Symposium on Human Rights held in Budapest, Hungary in
March, 1993, when there was, as a Hungarian participant in the conference noted, a "war in the
neighborhood." Those facts, a central European forum and a war, provided the background for
the paper and for the discussion of the paper at the conference and added an urgency to the
conversation which is not always felt in relation to treatments -which use as their starting place
historical events.
I would like particularly to thank the following individuals for assistance of various kinds:
Jody Freeman, Richard Kay, Elizabeth Kiss, Mark Janis, Leon Lipson, Martha Minow, and
Aviam Soifer. Of course they are not responsible for anything said here.
I. JACOB ROBINSON ET AL., WERE THE MINORITIES TREATIES A FAILURE? 265 (1943).
2. WOODROW WILSON. TIlE STATE: ELEMENTS OF HISTORICAL AND PRACTICAL POLITICS 636
(rev. ed. 1902)(1898).
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is that, as Roscoe Pound wrote in 1947, "[m]en with very different
conceptions of the social order, groups of men with one ideal or picture
of what ought to be and other groups with wholly divergent pictures,
must live together and work together in a complex social organiza-
tion."'3 This, he concluded, "is the situation within each state and the
condition in a world society is the same magnified."4
A focus on material at the international level is particularly valua-
ble for seeing the issue of normative diversity and the need for
frameworks to accommodate many images of the good life. A conversa-
tion on this subject at the domestic state level is limited not only by the
details of a specific legal system but by the image of the nation-state
itself, which is often dominated by the idea of unity. The ideology of
the state frequently stresses ideas of the common culture, if not the
common background, as the aspiration, if not the fact, of the state en-
terprise. The state sees the issue of minorities as a we/they problem, in
which we are many and they are few. This seems to be true regardless
of how diverse in fact a particular state may be. By contrast, at this
time, at least, the international conversation invokes ideas of philo-
sophic and cultural unity only occasionally and largely rhetorically. We
tend to concede that the family of man is a quarrelsome one, and that,
as was once suggested, "looking around the world, it appears that if all
men are brothers, the ruling model is Cain and Abel." 5
At the domestic level, the problem of difference is often seen in
terms of difference from an assumed norm. At the international level
the problem of difference becomes the problem of cultural and norma-
tive diversity, multiplicity of authorities, and even chaos. It is therefore
at the international level that we can usefully look for thinking which
addresses the issue of frameworks, efforts in the direction of some sort
of federalism,6 with some sort of minimal understandings and some sort
3. Roscoe Pound, Toward a New Jus Gentium, in IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD
ORDER 1, 9 (F. S. C. Northrop ed., 1949).
4. Id. This perspective, while useful here, minimizes the point that the nation-state is (often)
more unified and better able to mobilize force than the world-society.
For Northrop's criticism of Pound's view of the jus gentiurn, see F. S. C. Northrop, Contern-
porar' Jurisprudence and International Law, 61 YALE L.J. 623, 653 (1952)(urging that Pound's
"weak sociological jus gentiurn [should be] enriched by, strengthened and transformed into the
eventual natural law jus gentium or jus naturale"). Northrop also invoked the term "living law
pluralism," used below. Id. at 648.
5. Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L. REV. 1229, 1249.
6. Minority rights and different forms of national association are under discussion in Hungary
now. See Stephen Engelberg, Now Hungary Adds Its Voice to the Ethnic Tumult, NY. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 1993, at A3. See also the federalist ideas of Count Mihdly Kdrolyi, described by
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of minimal guarantees 'of universally acknowledged human rights, as-
suming that we can identify them.
But if the bloodthirstiness and brutality of tribalism are constantly
before us, the strategies for solutions remain controversial and/or unde-
veloped. Disenchantment with various kinds of modern universalism,
often seen as the alternative to tribalism or particularism, is profound.
A world-philosophy which seemed possible to some after the Second
World War - a universalism based on secular humanism, enlightened
reason and a possible redistribution of wealth - no longer seems so
obviously the world-view to be preferred by all clear-thinking people or
the ideology towards which the human race in general is in fact tend-
ing. Indeed, this ideology has been rejected by many - witness the
strength of conservative and fundamentalist religion - sometimes in
ways reminiscent of times we had hoped were past.
Perhaps, as background to the current discussion, we can recall
the state of the question as it was left after the First World War, when
the issue was treated against the background of an immediate need to
do something under the auspices of an international authority. After
the First World War, the League of Nations undertook two broad ap-
proaches to the issue of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities. The
first was rooted in the idea of the homogenous state and involved popu-
lation exchanges.7 The second, revealed in the system of minorities
treaties established after the war, was based on the assumption that
national minorities might always be characteristic of states and that a
method had to be devised for accommodating and/or regulating them.
These two approaches, and particularly the questions left open by the
second, are the subject of this paper. The League of Nations ap-
proaches are described and then discussed not from the perspective of
international law (a perspective perhaps inevitably focused on the is-
sues of legitimacy and enforcement) but from the perspective of plural-
ist theory. How did the League actually see the internal groups? What
sorts of groups were under discussion? What was expected from the
environing state in support of those groups? This paper focuses on the
League experiment as one form of pluralist framework encompassing
Rothschild as a "lone dissenter from the inherited ideology of the Magyar nobility." JOSEPH
ROTHSCHILD. EAST CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE Two WORLD WARS 139 (6th prtg.
1990)(1974). Rothschild describes Kirolyi's plan as involving a "federalistic reorganization of the
millennial kingdom." Id. at 140. On Kfirolyi, see MEMOIRS OF MICHAEL KAROLYI FAITH WITH-
OUT .LUSION (Catherine Karolyi trans., 1956).
7. Of course territorial adjustments may also be based on the idea of homogeneity.
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highly diverse internal ordering systems. The period between the two
wars has been seen as a kind of golden age with reference to this one
point. Political scientist Rogers Brubaker uses the term "benign differ-
entialism" to mean a "noninvidious legal differentiation along ethnocul-
tural lines that assigns special rights or privileges to persons in their
capacities as members of ethnocultural groups, typically as a means of
guaranteeing the free practice of their religion, language or culture."8
He notes that the "fabulously complex world of the Hapsburg empire[]
and East Central Europe in the early interwar period, the golden age
(quickly tarnished, to be sure) of formal minority rights - affords
multiple examples of such benign differentialism." 9
Against this background, the paper is organized this way: the first
section reviews the approaches of the League in dealing with the mi-
norities question. It raises some theoretical questions relating to two
central issues, the first is the problem of membership, the "who" ques-
tion, the second is the issue of which minority groups count for pur-
poses of a pluralist structure, the "which" question. The suggestion is
made here that much of the discussion of group rights in the context of
international human rights is not essentially about a group right, but
rather about recognition of a group presence. The further suggestion is
made that speaking seriously about a group right requires consideration
of a group's power over its own members, and the supervisory role of
the largest authority in relation to that group power. This is examined
in this article through issues touching group self-definition in the con-
text of education, which, as much as discipline or expulsion, concerns a
group's authority over its members.
Thus, the paper focuses in the second section on issues relating to
minority education in the international order under the Minorities
Treaties, and then in one domestic order, the United States, under one
particular constitution. Education is one of the critical contexts for the
application of any political idea. It is through education, whether in the
home"° or in private (non-state) schools, that minorities of all kinds
8. ROGERS BRUBAKER. CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 177
(1992).
9. Id. at 178 (citation omitted).
10. Elshtain has noted that the family is often attacked as "the example par excellence of
imbedded particularity." Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Family and Civic Life, in REBUILDING THE
NEST 119, 121 (David Blankenhorn et al. eds., 1990).
For family rights and language rights, see The Belgian Linguistics Case, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A)(1968). For a digest of the case, see MARK W. JANIS & RICHARD S. KAY. EUROPEAN
HUMAN RI(IITs LAW, 183-85 (1990). The court found that the Belgian system on geographic
[Vol. 8:359
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create new generations of people identifying themselves as members of
that minority. Thus it has been noted that "[t]he autonomy of the fam-
ily defines an often unrecognized condition for the transmission of reli-
gious and ethnic pluralism from one generation to the next."" It is also
through public education, or publicly enforced norms of education in
private schools, that the central structure asserts its values. The prob-
lem becomes, then,- not the issue of the classification of groups but
rather our sense of the role of the state. We have recently seen the
state occupying a large space and incorporating most significant values.
With an emphasis on groups, and the fluid aspects of group affiliations,
we may find it useful to refine our position on these issues. The present
paper suggests some questions to consider in doing so.
I. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE MINORITIES ISSUE
The co-existence of several nations under the same State is a
test, as well as the best security of its freedom. It is also one of
the chief instruments of civilisation; and, as such, it is in the
natural and providential order, and indicates a state of greater
advancement than the national unity which is the ideal of
modern liberalism.
Lord Acton 2
A. The Nature of the State
The idea that states should be composed of one people is old, with
people referring often to ideas of ethnicity and nationality. Rogers Bru-
baker offers some detail. He describes a model of the national state -
the state composed of a culturally homogeneous nation - and summa-
rizes a number of ideas associated with that model. One of these ideas
has to do with the concept of the nation, and the point that "state
membership should be based on nation-membership."' I The goal is that
[t]he political community should be simultaneously a cultural
division for language instruction was incompatible with Article Two of the First Protocol of the
Europcan Convention on Human Rights, which provides for respect for the "'rights of parents."
Id. at 183.
1I. JAMES S. FISHKIN. JUSTICE. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE FAMILY 59 (1983).
12. JOHN EMERICH EDWARD DALBERG-ACTON, Nationality, in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND
POWER 166, 185 (2d prtg. 1949).
13. William Rogers Brubaker, Introduction to IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZEN-
SIHIP IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 1, 4 (William Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989)(emphasis
omitted).
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community, a community of language, mores, or belief. Only
thus can a nation-state be a nation's state, the legitimate rep-
resentative and authentic expression of a nation. Those aspir-
ing to membership of the state must be or become members of
the nation. If not (presumptively) acquired through birth and
upbringing, such nation-membership must be earned through
assimilation. 4
The goal of creating a complete identification of state and nation
has been attempted by those who under various slogans - currently of
course "ethnic cleansing" - have attempted to expel minorities, some-
times in the expectation that another nation, perhaps "their" nation,
would accept them, sometimes without any expectation or plan beyond
the expulsion itself.
1. Population Exchanges
The idea of population exchanges in the interest of homogeneity is
at least one step beyond simple expulsion. The experiments undertaken
by the League of Nations in relation to the Greek, Bulgarian and
Turkish populations in the early twentieth century were an attempt to
work out a difficult problem under international authority, with a cer-
tain regard for the welfare of the populations being exchanged. 5 A
study in 1932 by Stephen Ladas describes the exchanges as a "supple-
ment" to the Minorities Treaties and details the steps intended for pro-
tection of the property claims of the exchanged populations.' 6 While
14. Id. at 4. The naturalness of this idea is so great that we do well as a corrective to juxta-
pose it with an observation of Ralph Waldo Emerson:
In dealing with the State we ought to remember that its institutions are not aboriginal,
though they existed before we were born; that they are not superior to the citizen; that
every one of them was once the act of a single man; every law and usage was man's
expedient to meet a particular case; that they all are imitable, all alterable; we may make
as good, we may make better.
RALPt WALDO EMERSON, Politics, in ESSAYS 199 (2d series, Houghton Mifflin 1903)(1876).
To the ideology of nationalism as a centralizing force, one can add the impact of different but
equally unifying ideas derived from Marxism-Leninism or religious traditions.
15. The model was invoked by Rebecca West in the character of Gerda, who refers to the
Slavs in Germany, saying "[blut if all the Wends are Slavs .. .why do we not send them out of
Germany into the Slav countries, and give the land that they are taking up to true Germans?"
REBECCA WEST, BLACK LAMB AND GREY FALCON: A JOURNEY THROUGH YUGOSLAVIA 507 (Pen-
guin Books 1982)(1941). Gerda is a generally unpleasant figure. West's book was written, she
says, to explain what a typical (hardly) English woman in the late 1930s understood about the
causes of the, as she understood it, inevitable war with Germany. Id. at 1089.
16. See generally STEPHEN P. LADAS. THE EXCHANGE OF MINORITIES: BULGARIA. GREECE
ANi) TURKEY (1932).
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the Turkish-Greek exchange was compulsory, the Bulgarian-Greek ex-
change was voluntary. The purpose of that exchange was outlined in
the advisory opinion of 1930 concerning the Greco-Bulgarian
Communities:
The general purpose of the instrument is by as wide a
measure of reciprocal emigration as possible, to eliminate or
reduce in the Balkans the centres of irredentist agitation
which were shown by the history of the preceding periods to
have been so often the cause of lamentable incidents or serious
conflicts, and to render more effective than in the past the pro-
cess of pacification in the countries of Eastern Europe.17
Patrick Thornberry sees the compulsory Turkish-Greek exchange18
of population in the 1920s as an effort whose central thrust was not
protection of minority rights. Thus, he writes of the 1923 Greek-Turk-
ish Convention that it is a "notorious inter-war example of a treaty
exhibiting a reverse [non-protective] tendency."' 9 Thornberry con-
cludes that "[t]he transfer, which involved appalling human misery,
was initiated by a treaty which represents the crudest expression of
State power over individuals and groups."20
17. Advisory Opinion No. 17, Greco-Bulgarian "Communities," 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17,
at 19 (July 31).
18. The Convention signed at Lausanne in 1923 provided that "[ais from the Ist May, 1923,
there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion
established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in the
Greek territory." PATRICK THORNBERRY. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES
51 (1991)(noting that Article I provides that these parties were not to return to live in the respec-
tive countries of origin unless authorized by the relevant governments). See generally LADAS,
supra note 16. See also ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 57 (calling the exchange a "drastic
repudiation" of the purpose of the Treaties); and ISTVAN BIB6, The Distress of the East European
Small States [1946], in DEMOCRACY. REVOLUTION. SELF-DETERMINATION: SELECTED WRITINGS
71 (Andriis Boros-Kazai trans., Kdroly Nagy ed., 1991).
19. THORNBLRRY, supra note 18, at 51.
20. Id. The central group definition used was religious. Moslems were to go to Turkey, even if
"Greek," while Greek Orthodox Turks were to go to Greece.
Professor Olympiad loffe provides an example of a state imposing a group membership, with-
out necessary relation to the standards used by the group itself. He describes the practice of the
Soviet Union in imposing the label "Jew" on non-Jews seeking emigration who were going to
Israel. OLYMPIAD S. IOFFE. HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (1983).
See also the discussion of whether Jew is an ethnic or religious term in note 82, infra. Note
the differences, even in the Holocaust, of this aspect of the definitional problem. Hitler used a
racial definition and the Bulgarians used a religious definition, and thus the latter provided escape
for some Jews who converted. LucY S. DAWIDOWICZ. THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS: 1933-1945,
at 388 (1975).
By the time the story of the Turkish-Greek exchange was told in 1931, the League of Nations
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The exchanges remain controversial, particularly to the extent that
they were compulsory. 1 When Fridtjof Nansen, League of Nations
Commissioner on Refugees, defended the exchanges, he did so on a
very limited basis.22 Turkey had already expelled many Greeks, and
"there could be no question that the Turks intended to expel the few
who remained. Surely it was all to the good that this should be done in
a legal manner with proper safeguards, thereby, inter alia, securing
their economic interests. 213
But the populations exchanges are remembered as one solution to
an apparently intractable problem. Thus others faced with issues ap-
parently equally intractable have occasionally invoked their example.24
2. The Minorities Treaties 5
An experiment under the League of Nations in many ways more
congenial was established under the treaties imposed on a number of
could have dropped out of the narrative. Thus, The New York Times of November II, 1931,
reported the facts of the exchange in a way which eliminated the role of the League.
Istanbul, Nov. 10. - The Foreign Minister telegraphed today to all Turkish consuls
authorizing them to issue visas to exchanged Greeks desiring to revisit Turkey ....
The exchanged Greeks are those former Grecian residents of Turkey who were expelled
by the Angora Government a decade ago. In retaliation for this action Greece expelled
all Turkish subjects from her territories.
Turkish Consuls to Issue Visas For Visits by Exchanged Greeks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. II, 1931.
21. It should be noted, however, that duress may be involved in even voluntary exchanges.
22. FRIDTJOF NANSEN. ARMENIA AND THE NEAR EAST 23ff. (Da Capo Press 1976)(1928).
It may be objected that it was hard for the Turkish population in Greek territory to be
compelled to leave their peaceful homes, where they had not been interfered with; and
there is no denying that they had to suffer for the sins of their kinsmen in Turkey. But
the intention was that they should receive full compensation, and they should get plenty
of fertile land that had been left untenanted in Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor, where
they could settle among people of the same race and faith. There appeared to be no doubt
that this plan would give good results in the future, by creating more homogeneous popu-
lations and removing one chief cause of the endless conflicts, often attended by mas-
sacres, in the Near East.
Id. at 25.
Fridtjof Nansen, (d. 1930) the Norwegian explorer, was head of the League of Nations Com-
mission on Refugees. He was highly regarded for his work, which included an unsuccessful at-
tempt to devise a solution to the Armenian issue. Nansen Dies at 68, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1930,
at I, 14.
On "Nansen passports," certificates for stateless persons, see MICHAEL R. MARRUS. THE UN-
WANTED: EUROPEAN REFUGEES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 94-95 (1985). The documents were
recognized finally by 51 countries.
23. NANSEN, supra note 22, at 25-26.
24. See PALESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION REP.. PRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
TlE COLONIES TO PARLIAMENT BY COMMAND OF HIS MAJESTY, 1937, CMD. 5479, at 389-93.
25. These are sometimes referred to as "Minorities Treaties" and sometimes as "Minority"
[Vol. 8:359
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nations after the First World War whose purpose, at least in part, was
understood to be the protection of certain minorities, particularly eth-
nic, linguistic, and religious. These treaties were between governments,
in the conventional sense.2 6
These treaties, broadly speaking, assured the rights of internal mi-
norities in countries whose majority populations were understood to be
different ethnically, nationally, or religiously. The Treaties were signed
between 1919 and 1920 by the Allies with five states: Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece.17 Minorities clauses were
incorporated in treaties with four defeated states: Turkey, Austria, Bul-
garia and Hungary.
It was stressed in 1945 that the objective of the Treaties, though
involving protection of minorities, had not been primarily humanita-
rian, but rather political. Reviewing various forms of international pro-
tection, the former director of the Minorities Questions Section of the
League of Nations, Pablo Azcfrate, wrote: "The essential aim of [one
kind of] protection might be to shield the minorities from the danger of
oppression by the majorities and from the pain and suffering, both
moral and material, which such oppression necessarily causes.' 28
A system like that could be called humanitarian. But the League
system was not like that. "The object of the protection of minorities
treaties.
On historical background relating to the Treaties, including the drafting of the Treaties, see
particularly C A. MACARTNEY. NATIONAL STATES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES (Russell & Rus-
sell 1968)(1934).
26. Thus the idea that the groups themselves might be sovereign and appropriately party to
treaties is not invoked here. An initial caveat is in order. To say that rights are guaranteed by
treaties or constitutions is not to say that they will be honored in fact, or even that they will be
ultimately vindicated by a judicial system theoretically committed to the rule of law when they
are violated by governments which reject the rule of law. There are examples of constitutional
statements too unreal even to be considered in the category of legal propositions expressive of
values even when they are not the instrumental values of the society. And a rule of law which is
honored in fact may, as in the case of group libel legislation in Nazi Germany, not operate to the
benefit of groups which are in theory the beneficiaries of such legislation.
27. Romania, Yugoslavia (Serb, Croat, Slovene State) and Greece were on the Allied side
during the war. Poland and Czechoslovakia were new states. The nations bound by the Treaties
might be also minorities in other states. Thus, Theodore Woolsey wrote in support of the provi-
sions on minorities: "'We recall the repeated efforts of Prussia to stamp out language and spirit of
nationality in her Polish subjects, and still more those of Russia." Theodore S. Woolsey, The
Rights.of Minorities Under the Treaty with Poland, 14 AM . INT'L L. 392, 392 (1920).
Some states (e.g., Albania) made Declarations to the League on the question of minority
rights. See text accompany note 108.
28. PABLO DL AZCRATE Y FL6REZ. LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND NATIONAL MINORITIES AN
EXPERIMENT 14 (Eileen E. Brooke trans., 1945).
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which those treaties committed to the League of Nations was to avoid
the many inter-state frictions and conflicts which had occurred in the
past, as a result of the frequent ill-treatment or oppression of national
minorities."29
The model for all the Treaties was the Polish Treaty, signed at
Versailles in 1919. The Polish Treaty called for what were later termed
negative and positive rights. The negative rights were what Americans
would probably refer to as rights relating to equal treatment, or based
on the idea of non-discrimination." The positive rights called for the
state to act to promote group interests.
Articles two, seven, eight, and nine indicate the spirit and tone of
all of the Treaties. Article two provided that "[a]ll inhabitants of Po-
land shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of
any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with
public order or public morals." 3' 1
Article seven provided for equality before the law and equal civil
and political rights for all Polish nationals without distinction "as to
race, language or religion. '"32
Article eight provided:
Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic
minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law
.and in fact as the other Polish nationals. In particular, they
shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at
their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions,
29. Id. Writing in 1934, Macartney agreed that the Treaties were not primarily humanitarian,
seeing the goals as peace, (first), through stability of the treaty countries, (second), which had
been often jeopardized by mistreatment of minorities, (third). MACARTNEY, supra note 25, at 279.
He also thought, as against the group or collective rights reading of the Treaties (held then and
now by various writers), that the Treaties were essentially built on the modern idea of the nation-
state, without intermediate sovereign or quasi-sovereign groups. Id. at 283. Thornberry also writes
that the Treaties were not group centered. THORNBERRY, supra note 18, at 48.
More recently, Robert Cover read the Treaties as premised on the idea "that the nation-state,
ordinarily dominated by a single racial, religious, or ethnic group, might fail to afford the benefits
of its political processes to the racial, religious, or ethnic minorities within the state." Robert M.
Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1298
(1982) (reading the Treaties in relation to footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
The Treaties are also discussed in H. ARENDT. THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1958).
30. See generally Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976).
31. The Treaty with Poland, June 28, 1919, chap. 1, art. I, 225 Consol. T.S. 412 (entered into
force Jan. 10, 1920), reprinted in THORNBERRY, supra note 18, at 399, 400.
32. Id., art. VII, reprinted in id. at 401.
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schools and other educational establishments, with the right to
use their own language and to exercise their religion freely
therein. 3
Article nine provided:
Poland [must] provide in the public educational system in
towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Po-
lish nationals of other than Polish speech are residents ade-
quate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the
instruction shall be given to the children of such Polish nation-
als through the medium of their own language. 4
The Polish government could, however, make the teaching of the Polish
language obligatory. State funding of minority schools was also author-
ized where there "is a considerable proportion of . . .minorities." 35
The Polish Treaty contains two clauses directly referring to the
rights of Jews (particularly sabbatarian rights), a reference explained
by Georges Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference, as necessi-
tated by the history of the Jews in Poland. 6 In his letter transmitting
33. Id., art. VIII, reprinted in id.
34. Id., art. IX, reprinted in id.
35. Id. at 402. As historian Salo Baron noted, there is a range of claims associated with the
idea of group autonomy rights. One idea relates to control of schools, cultural institutions and the
goal of a plural society. But in addition, he writes, wherever possible, "the minorities also sought
to secure the right to collect a proportionate part of the governmental expenditures for schools,
hospitals, and other cultural and charitable institutions." SALO W. BARON, ETHNIC MINORITY
RIGHTS: SOME OLDER AND NEWER TRENDS 4 (1985). And, he adds, in some cases "national
minorities demanded, and occasionally obtained, quotas in political elections, for the most part in
the form of electoral curias with each minority being allotted a percentage of officials to be
elected equal to its percentage in the population." Id. On this issue at the Peace Conference, see
DAVID HUNTER MILLER, 13 MY DIARY: AT THE CONFERENCE OF PARIS 56 (1924)(diary entry,
May 16, 1919).
36. Letter from Clemenceau to M. Paderewski (June 24, 1919), in H. W. V. TEMPERLEY, 5 A
HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS 432 (H. W. V. Temperley ed., 1921)(transmitting
the Treaty to M. Paderewski, one of the signers for Poland). For Paderewski's view on the Trea-
ties generally, see his comments in MILLER, supra note 35, at 171-79 (Report of Committee o
New States, Memorandum by M. Paderewski, dated June 15, 1919).
See generally on the Jews in Poland in the period of the First World War, ARTHUR L. GOOD-
HART. POLAND AND THE MINORITY RACES (1920). Goodhart was counsel to a factfinding mission
appointed by President Wilson to investigate reports of the murder of Jews in Poland.
Other treaties mentioned other minorities specifically. See, e.g., THORNBERRY, supra note 18,
at 43 (referring to the Szeklers and Saxons of Transylvania, the Vlachs of Greece, and the
Ruthenes of the Carpathians).
In addition, some treaties made provisions for the application of personal (Muslim) law. E.g.,
the Serb-Croat-Slovene Treaty, art. 10, reprinted in TEMPERLEY, supra, at 451.
See also the treaty with Czechoslovakia, providing in Article 10 that Czechoslovakia under-
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the Polish Treaty, Clemenceau wrote as to the special provisions for
Jews:
The information at the disposal of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers as to the existing relations between the
Jews and the other Polish citizens has led them to the conclu-
sion that, in view of the historical development of the Jewish
question and the great animosity aroused by it, special protec-
tion is necessary for the Jews of Poland. These clauses have
been limited to the minimum which seems necessary under the
circumstances of the present day, viz. the maintenance of Jew-
ish schools and the protection of the Jews in the religious ob-
servance of their Sabbath. It is believed that these stipulations
will not create any obstacle to the political unity of Poland.
They do not constitute any recognition of the Jews as a sepa-
rate political community within the Polish State.37
The Treaties generally are often viewed as a failure.3 8 They did
not prevent the Second World War and they did not ultimately protect
vulnerable minorities. And of course they were politically suspect inso-
far as they were imposed by the victors on others, but not on them-
selves, despite the fact that the victors also had significant minorities
takes to constitute the Ruthene territory as "an autonomous unit within the Czecho-Slovak State,
and to accord to it the fullest degree of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czecho-
Slovak State." Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associate Powers and Czecho-Slovakia,
Sept. 10, 1919, art. 10, No. 20, Cmd. 479, quoted in TEMPERLEY, supra, at 465. In general, the
Treaties did not speak of autonomous units.
For a description of minorities covered by the Treaties, see MACARTNEY, supra note 25, at
518-42 (appendix Ill).
37. Letter from Clemenceau to M. Paderewski (June 24, 1919), in TEMPERLEY, supra note 36,
at 436.
38. See generally ROBINSON ET AL., supra note I. For recent discussions on the rights of
groups and indigenous populations, see generally THE RIGHTS OF PEOPL.ES (James Crawford ed.,
1988) (collecting essays on the subject of peoples or group rights in the international context):
Symposium, The Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1195 (1991) (collecting
essays on national, ethnic and minority rights); NATAN LERNER. GROUP RIGHTS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1991). Articles on human rights often include at least a brief description of the
Minorities Treaties as background to current issues. See, e.g., Andrds B.'Baka, The European
Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Minorities Under International Law, 8
CoNN. J. INT'L L. 227 (1993).
The League in 1922 also adopted a provision referring to the obligation of loyalty to the state
which was imposed on the minorities. See Asbjorn Eide, Minority Situations: In Search of Peace-
ful and Constructive Solutions, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1311, 1319 (1991).
For a detailed examination of the Treaty provisions, see also ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 1,
at 36ff.
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issues to deal with.39
But the failures of the Treaties are not the only things recalled.
Jacob Robinson and his associates, for example, saw the strengths of
the system, and more recently, Natan Lerner has said:
Among the merits of the system, the following should be
stressed: minority schools were established in several coun-
tries; neglected groups were rehabilitated; forced assimilation
was resisted; and representatives of democratic minority
groups could play a role in the political affairs of countries
such as Czechoslovakia and Latvia. Moreover, the methods of
mediation and conciliation produced some results, and the
Permanent Court of International Justice contributed to the
protection of minorities with important decisions, of great
value even today. 40
David Weissbrodt, one of a number of contemporary authorities in the
field of human rights to include a discussion of the Minorities Treaties
as a background to a current discussion, sees the system as "the first
extensive multilateral system for the protection of minorities.""
A failure or not, the Treaties are considered to have been super-
seded by the current United Nations materials on international human
rights.42 It is often noted, however, that the current material does not
focus explicitly on issues of minorities, or indeed of collectivities, but
largely addresses issues in terms of the rights of individuals. This is
sometimes viewed as a weakness in the present human rights effort. But
it is also possible to see the question differently. Arcot Krishnaswami,
rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, writing in 1960, under-
stood that the limitation to specified groups in the Minorities Treaties
was a weakness. The guarantees "applied only in respect of members of
racial, religious or linguistic minorities," he wrote.43 While in the Uni-
39. Robinson offers an elaborate statement of the problems. See generally ROBINSON LT Al...
supra note I. In 1934, Poland in effect renounced its duties under the Minorities Treaty. Id. at
178-79. By 1939, Thornberry concluded, the system had stopped functioning. See TtIORNBERRN,
supra note 18, at 46.
40. LERNER, supra note 38, at 11.
41. David Weissbrodt, Human rights: an historical perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS I, 3 (Peter
Davies ed., Guernsey Press 1991)(1988).
42. See THORNBERRN, supra note 18, at 52ff.
43. ARCOT KRISHNASWAMI. STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS AND PRACTICES. SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION
ot: MINORITIES, at 12. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. 60.XIV.2 (1960),
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versal Declaration of Human Rights, "[e]veryone has the right to free-
dom of thought, conscience and religion. 44
While some commentators call for more explicit recognition of
group rights and status 45 others have been cautious about the issues of
groups in the law. American discomfort with certain aspects of the Eu-
ropean group experience remains clear. For if the idea of the group
rights has in it the goal of compensation for historic violence and injus-
tice perpetrated against innocent people, it also has the idea of the priv-
ileges of the caste and the estate systems. Thus one has this description
of the constituted bodies of the eighteenth century: "Most of them had
in fact originated in the Middle Ages. Persons did have rights as mem-
bers of groups, not abstractly as 'citizens,' and all persons had some
legal rights, which, however, approached the vanishing point for serfs
in Eastern Europe and slaves in America." 46 Perhaps with an eye on
such issues, it has recently been said that the system of human rights
should not serve as a cover for the reintroduction of privilege, 7 and is
sometimes noted that the recognition of a group right does not yet
reach the possible conflicts between group rights and individual
rights.48
B. Some Unresolved Issues
1. Groups and Individuals
One version of the debate over groups and the state sees groups as
essentially without contemporary meaning. That is, religious and ethnic
groups are atavistic survivals of dying tribalism whose disappearance is
reprinted in I I N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 227-96 (1978). Arcot Krishnaswami (M.A., Cambridge
and Ph.D, London), an Indian barrister, published The Indian Union and the States, a book. on
Indian federalism, in 1964.
44. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 43, at 12. See also the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to
use their own language.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Dec. 19, 1966, art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
45. See generally Vernon Van Dyke, Justice as Fairness: For Groups?, 69 AM. Pot. ScL REV.
607 (1975); THORNBERRY. supra note 18.
46. R. R. PALMER. THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
EtRO'E AND AMERICA. 1760-1800, at 29 (1959).
47. Eide. supra note 38, at 1346.
48. E.g.. LIRNER. supra note 38, at 150.
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to be expected and welcomed as people come more and more to believe
and appreciate the same sorts of things. Julian Huxley is used in Part
II of this paper to represent a position along these lines.
Another version of the debate sees all groups as equally good -
giving perhaps a slight edge, on food at least, to one's own group -
and as not raising serious issues of contested value. Tolerance and re-
spect are demanded for all groups against what is seen as a continuing
background of groundless hatreds, murderous prejudices, and irrational
discrimination. Where we see social facts underlying the hatreds and
the prejudices, we say that these may explain some behavior, but can-
not justify it, and note that the "facts" are in any case quite often
untrue.
Yet another version attempts to say that, in effect, even if we
agree that groups have a right to existence, relativism and toleration
stand on a base of something agreed upon, and that some groups may
really be given to bad practices, directed to their own members or out-
siders or both. Their right to existence is then qualified by the idea that
we hope we can modify their practices - issues relating to the status
of women provide a clear example - and the mode of their existence.49
Somehow one must decide, globally and country by country, where the
lines are.
An American theorist once observed on the issue of groups, indi-
viduals, and the state that she was "advocating throughout the group
principle, but not the group as the political unit. We do not need to
swing forever between the individual and the group. We must devise
some method of using both at the same time." 5 Mary Parker Follett's
sense of what was needed holds true still. Liberal theory has conven-
tionally assumed that groups result from the choice of individuals, es-
sentially each group being created by a real or fictional social contract.
To speak of a conflict between an individual and a group is then really
49. This attempt by the outside to influence a group is of course an issue about appropriate
uses of state power. It also presents a problem under, for example, Capotortis' discussion of minor-
ity, which often includes the idea of loyalty to the true faith of one's forefathers. Francesco
Capotorti, The Protection of Minorities Under Multilateral Agreements on Huntan Rights, 2
ITAI.IAN Y.B INT'L L. 3, 14, 18 (1976). Change, whether or not state-fostered, becomes a reason
to challenge the legitimacy of the group.
50. MARY PARKER FOLLETT. THE NEW STATE: GROUP ORGANIZATION THE SOLUTION OF
POPUILAR GOVERNMENT 292 (1918). She continued: "But my relation to the state is always as an
individual. The group is a method merely." Id. "[N]o one group can enfold me, because of my
multiple nature. . . . But also no number of groups can enfold me. This is the reason why the
individual must always be the unit of politics, as group organization must be its method." Id. at
295.
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to speak of a conflict between one individual (or set of individuals) and
another set of individuals, claiming to represent the group. While it has
been noted that this view of groups as resulting from the choices of
individuals misrepresents to some degree the psychological situation -
since individuals do not perceive themselves as creating certain groups,
but rather often feel that the groups were there first5 ' - it seems also
to be true that this last observation, primarily empirical, is matched by
the opposite observation, which is that individuals often feel themselves
to be the founders of groups, whether these are associations, or inten-
tional communities, or families. The relationship works then in two di-
rections: individuals create groups and groups shape individuals.5 2
If "groups" is a short-hand for "created in fact or in meaning by
individuals," saying that groups have rights is simply another way of
saying that individuals have rights. Indeed, much of the American dis-
cussion about groups is not about the question of whether groups have
rights but rather about the question whether the group affiliations of
individuals should be given more weight than has been traditional in
the American legal system. Thus, when Aviam Soifer argues for the
importance of group life or the historical group experience, he is not
suggesting a shift to a group rights approach from an individual rights
approach. Rather, he is adding depth to an individual right of associa-
tion by adding a group dimension to our understanding of what is at
stake in a controversy.
51. See on this point, Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of
Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L REV. 99, 106ff. See also JACQUES PRESSER. THE NIGHT OF
THE GIRONDISTS (Harvill/Harper Collins 1992) (1957), for a fictional account of complex self-
identification and crisis of an assimilated Dutch Jew who assists the Nazis during the Holocaust.
The complexities of individual identity raise issues which cannot comfortably fit within the
two categories public/private. To begin with, one needs a third category, perhaps "inner," and
then one raises the question of the relation of that inner to what are conventionally considered the
public and private spheres. Sometimes one has an inner identity within a public sphere (whether it
is governmental or market, as when one considers oneself primarily a citizen, or a professional),
sometimes with a domestic/private sphere (as when one considers oneself primarily a mother).
Depending on historical context, a religious affiliation could be inner, and either public or private.
Robert Musil's novel, The Man Without Qualities, identifies "at least" nine characters for
the inhabitants of a country, as well as an inner tenth, still however shaped by one social situation.
ROBIRT MUSIL, I THE MAN WITHOUT QUALITIES 34 (Eithne Wilkins & Ernst Kaiser trans.,
Perigee Books/G. P. Putnam's Sons 1980)(1953). The novel is set in the dying Austro-Hungarian
Empire in Vienna, 1913.
52. Or, individuals (alone or in groups) create other individuals, continuously. See ANTON
CHEKHIOv. TIlE DARLING AND OTHER STORIES 3-22 (Constance Garnett trans., Ecco Press
1984)(1916), a story which can be read as describing a particularly uncentered woman, or as a
story about the social de-centering of all women, or as a story about the human condition. Com-
pare Tolstoy's reading, based on a view of woman's need to love, regardless of object. Id. at 25-26.
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This observation may also be true of other academic explorations
of these issues. When Yoram Dinstein says that the right to education
must be thought of as a group right rather than an individual right
because no individual can run a school, he seems to be saying simply
that individuals can act collectively. He does not seem to be focused on
a group right if by that we mean, for example, that the group right
displaces any individual right of individuals (as it might under fascism,
for example). 53 Indeed, Dinstein notes that "collective human rights re-
tain their character as direct human rights" and are collective only in
the sense apparently that "they shall be exercised jointly rather than
severally."5 Or perhaps they are collective because we believe that the
individual has waived all rights by contract and given them to the
group.55
A fairly strong illustration of a group rights issue is the issue of a
group's control over children lost or about to be lost through (illustra-
tively) war, genocide, or even conventional adoptions. To the extent
that the group has a claim independent of the claim or wishes of par-
ents, one might say that this is a group right. But even here, the group
can be understood as affiliated individuals, even though many of them
53. "Against individualism, the Fascist conception is for the State; and it is for the individual
in so far as he coincides with the State ...." Benito Mussolini, The Doctrine of Fascism, in THE
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 166 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 2d
ed. 1941).
And no groups, political, economic, or cultural, are outside the state. See generally Zeev
Sternhell, Fascist Ideology, in FASCISM: A READER'S GUIDE 315 (Walter Laqueur ed., 1976).
Referring to material around the time of the New Deal, Aviam Soifer has noted that at the
time of the New Deal, '[o]dious comparisons to Mussolini's fascist brand of syndicalism helped to
underscore a pervasive American distaste for government recognition of groups. Judicial opinions
and lawyers' arguments are full of references to the contrast between good old American individu-
alism and the treatment of people in old world group terms." Aviam Soifer, Freedom of Associa-
tion: Indian Tribes, Workers, and Communal Ghosts, 48 MD. L. REV 350, 366 (1989).
54. Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L COMP.
LQ. 102, 103 (1976).
55. Does inalienable right mean only a right that others cannot take away? Does it include the
idea that individuals or groups cannot alienate it? There was an attempt in at least one case to
renounce rights provided by the League, when minorities in Turkey said that they did not want to
be protected by the Minorities Treaties. This was described by Julius Stone as a legal nullity
(because the minorities were not parties to the Treaties). JULIUS STONE. INTERNATIONAL GUAR-
ANTEES OF MINORITY RIGHTS: PROCEDURE OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 22-23 (1932). Louis Marshall described it as an outrage. LOUIS MAR-
SHALl, The Renunciation of Minority Rights by Turkish Jews, in 2 LOUIS MARSHALL. CHAMPION
OF LIBERTY: SELECTED PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 575-76 (Charles Reznikoff ed., 1957)(statement
to the press on Aug. 10, 1926 on the action of Turkish Jews renouncing all national minority
rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923)). See ROBINSON FT Al., supra note
I, at 81, 288.
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are dead. 6
From a certain point of view, the most powerful group claim is
that of the state itself, for example, in enforcing compulsory education
over the objection of parents. But even this circles back to the question
of whether the state is or is not an association of individuals through
real or fictional consent.
The debate over group rights is based fundamentally on the idea
that individuals who have been persecuted as a group should be ac-
knowledged as a group in any public remedies.5 7 This, more than logi-
cal necessity, would seem to justify reference to particular religious
groups, for example, to Jews in the Polish Treaty where presumably a
reference to sabbatarians would have done as well.
Acknowledgement of the past as well as solutions in the present
require a discussion of the group idea, but not because a legal recogni-
tion of a group right is necessary for group life. Group rights can usu-
ally be easily understood in terms of individual rights. Individuals can
associate in many forms, corporate and non-corporate for various pur-
poses. For example, land can be held collectively through corporations
or a system of individual trustees. And, as Boris Bittker points out in
his discussion of group rights, the German reparations paid to Israel or
to the conference on Jewish material claims against Germany were pri-
marily payments made to the state which assisted refugee resettlement
and to the group which, in effect, represented residuary legatees.5 8
Perhaps we canask what turns on the question. Clearly we can
differentiate between different kinds of demands which are made by
individual members of groups on the larger system. Sometimes it is a
claim simply not to be discriminated against. In the strongest version of
this idea, once the discrimination disappears, the group disappears also,
since the group had no identification other than that caused by the in-
jury imposed by the outside system. In the different context of the
group autonomy idea, the members of the group seek some sort of cul-
tural recognition, sometimes, as already noted, with claims for support
56. The customs of the Amish, for example, document the great respect paid the testi-
mony of those who have died in the faith. (And such are, as Peter Taylor Forsyth once
pointed out, the majority of the faithful ... .)
Franklin H. Littell, Sectarian Protestantism and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Must Technological
Objectives Prevail?, in PUBLIC CONTROLS FOR NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS 72 (Donald A. Erickson ed.,
1969).
57. Owen Fiss argues for a principle which recognizes historically disadvantaged groups. See
Owen M. Fiss. Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
58. BORIS I. BITTKER. TIlE CAS[ FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 78 (1973).
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or direct representation.
If we ask whether it matters if we address these issues in terms of
something called an individual right or something called a group right,
we might say that the difference would be revealed in the attitude of
the outside state towards decisions made by the group over its own
members. That is, the group issue is tested by the deference given by
the state to, for example, the claims of the group to decide member-
ship, discipline or educational issues. Ultimately, issues of groups and
individuals will be what Crawford saw when he suggested that the
question is finally about the issue of the minority of minorities.59 Re-
lated to the issue of deference is the issue of representation, and the
question: "Who Speaks for the Group?" This is clearly difficult in the
case of disorganized groups, and is equally difficult, although different,
in the case of highly organized groups.
The problem of minorities and recognition of minorities becomes
one of control of minorities by the majority structure, at whatever level
we see it operating. A nation-state may have to review the decisions of
a (minority) smaller unit, governmental or non-governmental. The in-
ternational community provides another substantive level of review of
that decision and in that case the nation-state becomes an intermediate
level.60 If we view "living law pluralism"6'1 as good or inevitable, the
question is what form of global or state political organization can sus-
tain difference without disintegration.
It should be noted that difference is assumed in the present discus-
sion to be good. And it is assumed, as the English philosopher Leonard
Hobhouse put it, that "[e]ssentially political freedom does not consist
in likemindedness, but in the toleration of differences; or, positively, in
the acceptance of differences as contributing to richer life than uni-
formity." 62 For Hobhouse, difference is dealt with as an aspect of indi-
vidualism. The emphasis on individual rather than collective rights is
justified by its focus on experience rather than form. Individuals of
59. James Crawford, The Rights of People: 'Peoples' or 'Governments'?, in THE RIGCITS OF
PEOPLES, supra note 38, at 60. We behave as though communal or aboriginal societies are mono-
lithic, though of course this is not true in fact and may or may not be a goal.
Problems of political federalism can be explored through the issue of state review of individ-
ual exclusion from community. See Carol Weisbrod, Emblems of Federalism, 25 U. MICH. JL
REF. 1 (1992). See also illustration from Grotius, in infra note 173 and accompanying text.
60. This assumes a politically active and effective international community.
61. See Northrop, supra note 4, at 648.
62. LEONARD T. HOBHIOUSE. THE METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF THE STATE 60 (Greenwood
Press 1984)(1918). On Hobhouse, see generally JAN G. DEUTSCH. SELLING THE PEOPLE'S CADIL-
ILA( THE EDSLL AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1976).
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course relate to communities, and individuals are not eternally self-sep-
arated, and egoism is not the truth of the world. But, as Hobhouse
indicates, the focus on individuals is a recognition of the human
situation:
It is ... an effort to go back from institutions, laws and forms,
to the real life that lay behind them, insisting that this was a
life of individual men and women with souls to be saved, with
personalities to be respected, or simply with capacity for feel-
ing anguish or enjoying their brief span of life.63
Individualism can also reappear in the idea that one's interest in
group life and in the diversity of group life and even its sovereignty has
its root in the problem of individual autonomy. There is, on the individ-
ual level, an analogue of the point which Acton made as to the growth
of political liberty. Civil liberty for the individual, Acton argued, was a
result of the conflict over centuries between church and state.6" So too,
one might say that the claims of groups to normative authority over
individuals results in the freedom of those individuals to evaluate and
finally to choose between those normative claims."5
But even if we resolve the large issue of group and individual
rights, other issues remain, many of which have been discussed recently
in American scholarly and political discussion. For example, it is com-
mon now to find discussions of groups and group rights which distin-
guish between voluntary and involuntary groups.66 American discussion
63. HOSHOUSE, supra note 62, at 26. He also notes that the danger exists that an emphasis on
individual personality can be exaggerated "to the point of depreciating the common life" and that
"criticism might degenerate into anarchy." Id. at 26-27.
64. AcroN, The History of Freedom in Christianity, in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER,
supra note 12, at 58, 62.
65. See a discussion of this point in the context of a treatment of Proudhon in ALAN RITTER.
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON 210 (1969). Another emphasis sees the
value of pluralism in the richness it brings to society. See AMY GUTMANN. DEMOCRATIC EDUCA-
TION (1987).
66. See. e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713 (1988). On
these problems generally, see MARTHA MINOW. MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION. Ex-
CLUSION. AND AMERICAN LAW (1990).
Voluntary groups are said to be those which the individual chooses, and typical examples are
clubs, churches and professional associations. Involuntary groups are those into which the individ-
ual is born, and typical examples here are ethnic groups and racial groups.
See Aviam Soifer, On Being Overly Discrete and Insular: Involuntary Groups and the Anglo-
American Judicial Tradition, 48 WASH & LEE L. REv. 381 (1991); John H. Garvey, Introduc-
tion: The Rights of Groups, 80 Ky. L.J 862 (1991-92). Garvey suggests that complexity and
difficulties in the field can be illustrated by the case of the family which is voluntary from the
point of view of the couple - marriage being a status based on contract - but involuntary from
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has frequently raised the issue of the nature of the protection involved,
whether this was to be thought of as an affirmative obligation- to en-
courage the existence of the group, or simply a posture which did not
directly injure the group. We have also reached the question of the
systemic injuries created simply by minority status, particularly within
the educational context where injury may derive from no specific op-
pression or insult but simply from the fact of minority status.67 These
questions were broadly involved in Wisconsin v. Yoder,6" and resulted
in Philip Kurland's comment that Yoder was basically an ecology case,
presumably meaning that issues of group preservation were at the heart
of the controversy.69
But many explorations of group issues assume static (natural, in-
voluntary) and relatively few (black-white; male-female) memberships.
The present inquiry attempts to incorporate a recognition that the affil-
iations of individuals7" are multiple and changing.
Here, the perspectives of sociologists are of interest.71 As Professor
Daniel Bell wrote some time ago, the issue can be caught in the differ-
ence between "I, the subject" and "me, the object," i.e., the object in
effect of labels used by others.72 Bell addresses the issue of possible
group labels this way: "At particular times - but usually in relation
to an adversary, which gives it its political character - one specific
identification becomes primary and overriding and prompts one to join
the point of view of the children, born of the marriage. Id. at 862.
67. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out": Assimilation, In-
doctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L REV. 582, 584 (1993)(dis-
cussing the Mozert litigation).
68. 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
69. See Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W VA L REV 213, 245 (1972-73).
70. See generally FOLLETT, supra note 50; GEORG SIMMEL. CONFLICT AND THE WEB OF
GROUP-AFFILIATIONS (Kurt H. Wolff & Reinhard Bendix trans., Free Press Paperback ed.
1964)(1955); CHESTER . BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (Harvard Univ. Press,
1968)(1938).
71, See on the question of the-definition of minority, one having nothing necessarily to do with
numbers, HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSN'-
CIIOGy (1981). Writers on human rights frequently address the issue of the definition of minor-
ity, sometimes contrasting the international definition with domestic or sociological definitions,
sometimes assuming that the subject itself requires a definition focused on particular minority
groups. See generally JULES DESCHtNES. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNSEL.
SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES. PROPO-
SAL CONCERNING A DEFINITION OF THE TERM "'MINORITY." U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31
(1985).
72. Daniel Bell, Ethnicity and Social Change, in ETHNICITY THEORY AND EXPERIENCE 141,
159 (Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1975).
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a particular group; or, one is forced into a group by the action of
others."'7 3 But he writes, "there is no general rule to state which identi-
fication it might be." '74 Bell adds a discussion on the "range of diverse
identities available."75 His category "socially deviant" raises serious is-
sues for pluralism, since some identities may be anti-social or crimi-
nal.7 1 The critical idea here is the floating and contextual nature of the
paramount identification.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 159 n. 9. Bell lists the following as "Intermediate Social Units":
1. Political parties
2. Functional groups
a. Major economic interests: business, farm labor
b. Segmented economic interest: for example, professional associations
c. Economic communal groups: for example, the poor, the aged, the disabled
3. Armies
4. Voluntary associations (for example, consumer, civic)
5. Age-graded groups (for example, youth, students)
6. Ethos communal groups (for example, the "community" of science)
7. Symbolic and expressive identifications
a. Regional (for example, Texans)
b. Socially "deviant" (for example, drug cultures, homosexual)
Id.
See Reisman for a list of groups not limited to traditional ethnic or religious groups which
might in some contexts produce public disorder. W. M. Reisman, Responses to Crimes of Dis-
crimination and Genocide: An Appraisal of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrim-
ination, I J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 29, 45 (1971). For a list of groups not limited to traditional groups
which need protection, see Leon Lipson, Piety and Revision: How Will the Mandarins Survive
Under the Rule of Law?, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 191, 197 (1990).
76. One problem is that of creating political forms large enough to hold not only different
ethnicities but groups - and new groups - which compete ideologically, groups whose differ-
ences can not be described as "merely" physical or cultural, but must be treated as significant and
even possibly disturbing. This issue is litigated often in the United States in terms of the protec-
tions of the First Amendment's guarantee of religious liberty. But it raises problems which go
beyond "religious" differences to competing visions of the world, whether these are religious or
secular.
It is also possible to distinguish between good and bad kinds of pluralism. Thus historian
David Hollinger argues for a post-ethnic America, in which "affiliation on the basis of shared
descent would be voluntary rather than prescribed." David A. Hollinger, Postethnic America 2
CONTENTION 79, 79 (1992). He distinguishes between pluralism and cosmopolitanism, noting
"cosmopolitanism is willing to put the future of every culture at risk through the critical, sympa-
thetic scrutiny of other cultures ... [while] pluralism is more concerned to protect and perpetuate
particular, existing cultures." Id. at 83. "Cosmopolitanism is more oriented to the individual,
whom it is likely to understand as a member of a number of different communities simultaneously,
while pluralism is more oriented to the group, and is likely to identify each individual with refer-
ence to a single, primary community." Id.
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2. The Problem of Self-Evidence
The Minorities Treaties are the products of an intellectual world
in which two different issues are treated as self evident. The first is the
question of membership, i.e., who is actually a member of a linguistic
or religious or ethnic group. The second is the question of categories,
and raises the distinct issue of which memberships are important, or
which community memberships are relevant for what purposes.
About the first there is some writing," and about the second it
seems relatively little, possibly because self-evidence in this area seems
to be created by history and experience. Those memberships for which
people kill or die - now, in this place - it might be said, are the
relevant ones. Frankfurter wrote as a member of the most "vilified and
persecuted minority in history. ' 78 His minority status had been relevant
all too often.
Yet even here, one might wonder if this has not to do as much
with cultural perceptions as universal truth. Those memberships for
which people kill or die may be more complex than we are accustomed
to think. We can attach the label "class" or "economic" to issues for
which people have killed and died in the name of labels relating to race
or ethnicity. Those persecuted for religious heresy may "really" (that
is, through another lens) have been persecuted for intelligence or devi-
ance. Physical differences, and whether or not they are considered sig-
nificant or disabling, differences of age or sex, and whether they are
judged positively or negatively in particular contexts, are similarly
complex.7 9 Individual group and national histories all bear the marks of
construction and imagination.
a. The Membership Issue
Central to the question of minorities is the problem of identities
and identification. It is not merely the question who or what is a minor-
ity, a highly contested issue in itself. It is also the general question:
"Who is a What?" This relates essentially to the question: "Who
77. Notably BITTKER, supra note 58; MARC GALANTER. COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND
TIlE BACKWARD CLASSES IN INDIA (1984).
78. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943)(Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
79. Consider, for example, left-handedness or unusual weight. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Anti-
Woman Bias Basis for Asylum, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993, at A8 (discussing sex-based persecution
as a basis for asylum in Canada). It is common for gays and lesbians to be referred to as minori-
ties denied rights. On whether a physical characteristic, is an asset or a liability, see H G WELLS.
TIlE COU\TR 01; TIlE BLIND AND OTHER STORIES 536-68 (1911)..
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Wants to Know and for What Purpose?" Some of the complications of
this question are familiar. They may be illustrated here by a figure in
Rebecca West's book, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon. In the book, Con-
stantine is a poet, and a Serb, "that is to say a Slav member of the
Orthodox Church, from Serbia." 80 We are also told that his mother
was a Polish Jew. His father was a Russian Jew. Constantine is "by
adoption only, yet quite completely, a Serb." 8' Constantine would seem
to have various possible identifications. And his is, perhaps, an entirely
common case.
There are cases in which one particular form of identification
trumps all others, either in the mind of the individual or the practice of
an outside group. Constantine would have been a Jew under some defi-
nitions and usages. 2 People are in fact defined often by one thing,
which thing is often something into which they have been born. 3 But
in the American setting at least we have focused more and more on
self-definition and on limiting the impact of those identifications which
are not voluntary and on permitting freer choices of identities over a
lifetime." Some of the contexts in which we deal with these issues are
difficult and even technical. 5 The basic point, however, is that as a
culture we are concerned about ascribed statuses.
b. The Relevant Group
It is clear that the central issue of those pluralist structures with
which we are familiar, the millet system of the Ottoman Empire86 per-
haps, or the Pillars of Dutch pluralism, 87 is that from the point of view
80. WEST. supra note 15, at 41.
81. Id.
82. On what it means (in terms of religion or nationality) to be a Jew in different nation-state
systems, see SALO W. BARON. HISTORY AND JEWISH HISTORIANS: ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 19
(1964).
83. See Soifer, supra note 66.
84. See generally LAWRENCE M, FRIEDMAN. TOTAL JUSTICE (1985).
85. For a difficult context, see Carl E. Schneider, Religion and Child Custody, 25 U. MICH.
JL. REF. 879 (1992). For a technical context, see Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate
Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259 (Fall 1988).
86. The millet is a term "for the organized recognized religion-political communities enjoying
certain rights of autonomy under their own chiefs." BERNARD LEWIS. THE POLITICAL LANGUAGE
OF ISLAM 39 (1988). See also LtON OSTROROG. THE ANGORA REFORM (1927). "[I]n its spirit of
extreme liberalism towards non-Moslem creeds, Mohammedan Law prescribes not only tolerance
of, but strict non-interference with anything which, in the Mohammedan conception, is considered
as being within the province of the special religious beliefs of Jews and Christians... ." Id. at 79.
87. -Pillarization refers to a system of differentiation in which the major social, political, and
cultural institutions are segmented along religious-ideological lines. See AREND LIJPHART. DE-
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of problems of individual identity, the structure itself imposes an an-
swer to the question: "Which Identity Matters Most." (It may also im-
pose an answer to the question: "How do We Determine that Iden-
tity?") But it may be that the millet system and the Pillars of the
Dutch - petrified versions of what we commonly invoke as a "rain-
bow" 88 - are not the answer for a permanent or semi-permanent
structure. These work for a period of time, when a number of groups
are known, established, and of conceded importance within a particular
society. Thus, Arend Lijphart suggested some time ago that the high
point of Dutch pluralism - in the sense of pillarization - might al-
ready have been reached, and that now the society was not so seg-
mented.8" (Perhaps this is so because ethnic or religious affiliation is no
longer as important as it once was, though class differences might re-
main significant.9 ") Or it might be that in the Dutch case even a society
once segmented, then integrated, is now simply to be segmented again,
but along different lines, as by the entry of new immigrants. 9' In which
case there might be a role for pillars again.
And Horace Kallen's "cultural pluralism," while the term sticks,
may not be the answer either. To begin with, cultural pluralism is a
description finally of an attitude towards difference and at least. as cur-
rently used, suggests no particular structures. Further, to the extent
that Kallen himself thought in terms of "perfection of men according
to their kind," it raises problems. What is "my kind" is exactly the
point at issue.92 Kallen thought that certain identifications were perma-
MOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION 5 (1977), who calls it
consociationalism.
88. See Sullivan, supra note 66; Tony Hiss, The End of the Rainbow, THE NEW YORKER,
Apr. 12, 1993, at 43, 44 (discussing the Rainbow Curriculum in New York City). On a "rainbow
coalition," see Iris Marion Young, Polio' and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Uni-
versal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 264 (Jan. 1989). Note that the rainbow is limited to primary
colors on a spectrum which we can see. It is used as an image of diversity, but in fact may not be
the image we need.
89. Arend Lijphart thinks that its high point has been over because the society is no longer so
fragmented. LIJPIIART, supra note 87, at 1-2, 52. But doesn't the introduction of the new immi-
grants into Dutch society raise similar questions again?
90. For a review of the American class structure, see generally PAUL FUSSELL. CLASS (1984).
See also MEMOIRS OF MICHAEL KAROLYI, supra note 6, at 15 (noting Karolyi's cousin's identifi-
cation of himself, always, as an aristocrat).
See generally JAY A. SIGLER. MINORITY RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1983).
91. For writing on problems relating to new immigrants, see chapters eight and nine of DUTCH
DILEMMAS: ANTHROPOLOGISTS LOOK AT THE NETHERLANDS (Jeremy Boissevain & Jojada Verrips
eds., 1989). See also JANWILLEM VAN DE WETERING. OUTSIDER IN AMSTERDAM (Pocket Books
1978)(1975).
92. HORACE MEYER KALLEN. TIlE STRUCTURE OF LASTING PEACE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
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nent and natural: "[An Irishman is always an Irishman, a Jew is al-
ways a Jew. Irishman or Jew is born; citizen, lawyer or church-member
is made. Irishman and Jew are facts in nature; citizen and church
member are artefacts in civilization.""3 It is a stance that omits a fair
number of questions. They are, in fact, questions that are involved in
the limitations of the Minorities Treaties.
The strength of the Minorities Treaties is the positive approach to
the issue of minorities and group life. The limitation of the approach
taken in those Treaties is that in effect they perpetuate the understand-
ing of group life which characterized the millet system or Dutch pil-
larization. That is, the Treaties defined which particular group affilia-
tions were important, which then tends to reinforce that importance.
The limit to religious or linguistic or national groups privileges the
schools of those groups above, for example, schools whose relevant
group was based on particular talents or ideas. It allows no room for a
new group whose nature is presently unknown to the outside and possi-
bly to its own members.
A central objective, then, becomes that of relating the idea of plu-
ralist living law,94 and associations which are not traditional national or
religious groups, to the problem of the federalist framework.
II. EDUCATIONAL PLURALISM: AN APPLICATION
Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of
men that the defenses of peace must be constructed.
UNESCO Constitution95
MOTIVES OF WAR AND PEACE (Haskell House 1974) (1918). See also DAVID A. HOLLINGER. IN
THE AMERICAN PROVINCE: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF IDEAS (1985);
MILTON M. GORDON. ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE ROLE OF RACE. RELIGION AND NA-
TIONAL ORIGIN 141-45 (1964); Philip Gleason, American Identity and Americanization. in
HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 31 (Stephen Thernstrom, et al. eds., 2d
prtg. 1981). Kallen suggested some structures, including an internationalization of education. See
KALLEN, supra, at 174.
93. KALLEN, supra note 92, at 31.
94. Multiple codes surrounding the individual are described, inter alia, in BARNARD, supra
note 70. at 267. Note a problem with Barnard's intuitive ordering of the codes. He puts protection
of children first and the professional code second, with religion and citizenship codes last. But
protection of the child itself, for example, may be derived from the religious code.
95. U.N.E.S.C.O. CONST. pmbl., quoted in JULIAN HUXLEY. UNESCO: ITS PURPOSE AND ITS
PHILOSOPHY 5 (1947), who attributes the language to the labor leader Clement Atlee. 15 THE
ENCYIOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1566 (1971-72) says that the language is often attributed to the French
socialist Leon Blum.
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A. Universalism
One might recall, to begin with, the universalist efforts of Julian
Huxley.9" The grandson of T. H. Huxley, the grandnephew of Matthew
Arnold, and the brother of Aldous Huxley, Julian Huxley, the first di-
rector of UNESCO, was distinguished as a scientist and a humanist.
Interested always in large issues of human development, Huxley was a
well-known writer on many subjects, including issues of evolution and
humanistic religion. His appointment was indeed controversial because
of his position on revealed religion.97 But he also had a great vision for
mankind based on ideas of evolutionary humanism.
Huxley wanted a universal world philosophy, and wrote: "In order
to carry out its work, an organization such as UNESCO needs not only
a set of general aims and objects for itself, but also a working philoso-
phy, a working hypothesis concerning human existence and its aims
and objects."9 8 This would "dictate, or at least indicate, a definite line
of approach to its problems." 9 At the time of writing, at least, Huxley
thought that such an overview was essential. Without it, he thought,
"UNESCO will be in danger of undertaking piecemeal and even self-
contradictory actions; and will in any case lack the guidance and inspi-
ration which spring from a belief in a body of general principles."1 °
Huxley was essentially focused not on religion but on science.
While he might have viewed his philosophy as a kind of religion, much
of his discussion of religion sees religion in one of its historical roles, as
an opponent of science. UNESCO, he said, "cannot and must not toler-
ate the blocking of research or the hampering of its application by su-
perstition or theological prejudice." ' It must "disregard or, if neces-
sary, oppose unscientific or anti-scientific movements.""0 2  These
movements included "anti-vivisectionist, fundamentalism, belief in mir-
96, This discussion is adapted from Carol Weisbrod, The Brave New World of Julian Huxley,
Paper Delivered at the Amherst Conference on the "Paradox of Rights" (Nov. 6, 1992)(unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Connecticut Journal of International Law, University of Con-
necticut School of Law). Huxley served for two years as director of UNESCO. Perhaps by that
time he was overwhelmed by the practical problems of doing what he had in mind. And perhaps
he saw, as others came to, that UNESCO had itself a political dimension and was a political
organization. Just before his death in 1975 he criticized UNESCO for ostracizing Israel. Julian
Huxley, scientist and writer, dies, 87, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1975, at 1.
97. Julian Huxlej scientist and writer, dies, 87, supra note 96.
98. HUXLEY. supra note 95, at 6.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 37.
102. Id.
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acles, [and] crude spiritualism."'1 °3 He called for "widespread popular
education . . . in the facts of science, the significance of the scientific
method, and the possibilities of scientific application [which are re-
quired] for increasing human welfare."'0 4
But within a year or two Huxley had abandoned, if not the goal, at
least the idea that UNESCO could achieve it. By the time of the re-
publication of a part of Huxley's pamphlet in a volume published in
1949,105 Huxley had given up the idea of UNESCO's formulating a
world philosophy as an initial project. The single world philosophy was
not feasible. Presumably Huxley had come to see what is so obvious to
us, that is, the necessary particularisms involved in his version of
universalism.
The Minorities Treaties had already, at least implicitly, considered
and rejected the universalism of Huxley's approach in the provisions on
minority education. 0 6
B. Minority Schools in Albania
One issue brought to the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice"0 7 for an advisory opinion related to the status of minority schools
in Albania, and the interpretation of Article Five of the Albanian Dec-
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See JULIAN HUXLEY. UNESCO: ITS PURPOSE AND ITS PHILOSOPHY, reprinted in IDEO-
LOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER, 305 (F. S. C. Northrop ed., 1949).
Huxley said:
[Slince I wrote the pamphlet my views have somewhat changed. In the first place, I do
not now feel that UNESCO, in the present stage of its career, should even aim at formu-
lating an explicit philosophy. This would at best lead to interminable and on the whole
pointless debate, and might promote serious ideological conflict. What the first conference
of UNESCO and our subsequent years' work have taught us is that UNESCO can best
achieve its aims by undertaking a program of concrete and limited projects, and that on
such a program a remarkable degree of agreement can be reached among delegates with
astonishingly different philosophical, racial, and cultural backgrounds.
In the second place, although I still believe strongly in the need for the world to
reach an eventual agreement on some basic creed or philosophy, I would now lay less
stress on the urgency of this task and more on the immediate necessity of securing mu-
tual comprehension between different and apparently alien or even hostile cultures, as the
inevitable first step toward the later, unified "world philosophy."
Id. at 305.
106. United Nations documents on education continue to assert, in the context of parental
rights, values besides the values of the state philosophy. See, e.g., infra notes 160 and 161 and
accompanying text.
107. On the Permanent Court of International Justice, see Mark Janis, The International
Couirt. in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR TIlE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13 (Mark Janis ed., 1992).
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laration of 1921, which states:
Albanian nationals who belong to racial, religious or lin-
guistic minorities will enjoy the same treatment and security
in law and in fact as other Albanian nationals. In particular
they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage and con-
trol at their own expense or to establish in the future, charita-
ble, religious and social institutions, schools and other educa-
tional establishments, with the right to use their own language
and to exercise their religion freely therein.108
The background to the case is recalled by the historian Joseph
Rothschild. He writes that Ahmed Zogu, upon becoming "Zog I King
of the Albanians"1 9 in 1928, attempted as part of a general political
and cultural reform to deal with the schools: "The school system of the
Roman Catholic church was closed in 1933, when Zog nationalized all
education, but then reopened in 1936, upon the Franciscan Order's re-
luctant acceptance of state control and inspection.""'  Rothschild notes:
[The nationalization] was an assertion of Albanian national
pride specifically vis A vis Italian and Greek "paternalism," as
the supervisory and pedagogical staffs of most religious and
private schools were citizens of these two states and the ideo-
logical thrust of their teaching programs was felt to be the
inculcation of their own national values into Albanian
children."'
The case on minority schools in Albania challenged a provision of
the Albanian constitution of 1933 which gave the state entire authority
over education: "The instruction and education of Albanian subjects
are reserved to the State and will be given in State schools."' t 2 The
Greek minority submitted petitions to the Council of the League of
Nations under the procedures authorized,' and in January 1935, the
108. Advisory Opinion No. 49, Minority Schools in Albania, 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 49
[hereinafter Advisory Opinion No. 491, at 485.
109. A formula, Rothschild remarks, which alarmed Yugoslavia, which had a substantial Al-
banian minority. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 6, at 362.
110. Id. at 364.
Ill. Id. Pomerance notes that the "repeal of the controversial provisions in the Albanian Con-
stitution in accordance with the Court's guidelines effectively removed the grievance out of which
the petition to the Council had arisen." MICHLA POMERANCE. THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT IN TH4E LEAGUE AND U.N. ERAS 340 (1973).
112. Advisory Opinion No. 49, supra note 108, at 485.
113. See STONE, supra note 55, for the necessary procedures.
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Council requested the Court to give an advisory opinion on the inter-
pretation of Article Five of the Declaration of 1921. Albania and
Greece were both represented before the Court, as states best able to
provide information to the Court.
The Albanian government argued that any "interpretation which
would compel Albania to respect the private minority schools would
* create a privilege," ' and further, that the "minority regime is an ex-
traordinary regime, constituting a derogation from the ordinary
law."' 1 5 This being so, in case of doubt texts should be "construed in
the manner most favourable to the sovereignty of the Albanian
State."' 16
The particular issue addressed by the Court was whether the trea-
ties guaranteed simply non-discrimination or whether they guaranteed
treatment for those protected by treaty provisions better than the treat-
ment received by nationals in general. The Advisory Opinion elabo-
rated the point that the central purpose of the Minorities Treaties was
to protect group rights, and that this meant that a neutral principle of
non-discrimination would not be adequate:
The idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minori-
ties is to secure for certain elements incorporated in a State,
the population of which differs from them in race, language or
religion, the possibility of living peaceably alongside that pop-
114. Advisory Opinion No. 49, supra note 108, at 494-95.
115. Id. at 495.
116. Id. The Greek government urged a construction in light of the historical existence of
community rights in the region.
A central problem for international human rights is the conflict between any idea of limita-
tion on state power and the idea of sovereignty. See also for related issues, Joseph W. Singer,
Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. I (1992).
For a self-help manual on sovereignty, see ERWIN S. STRAUSS, HOW TO START YOUR OWN
COUNTRY (2d-ed. 1984).
Issues of minorities are closely connected to questions of claims to particular territories. Mi-
norities are frequently made so by shifts in territorial boundaries, and national minorities are
sometimes discussed in terms of their [assumed] desire to either constitute or reconstitute a state
or to join an existing state. The matter, however, is complex, on for example, the issue of knowing
what the group is and what it wants.
The problems intensify when one considers minorities which are not national but rather reli-
gious. or finally "other," that is, groupings other than the traditional religious ethnic or racial
groups. On the one hand, we might say that it is not clear that a [sovereign] territory is, for
example, a characteristic demand of gays and lesbians, or persons with physical disabilities. On
the other, we might conclude that issues of territory are involved, precisely because such groups,
as much as ideological or political groups, may want to found communities or towns, or concen-
trate themselves in neighborhoods as an expression of their autonomy.
[Vol. 8:359
MINORITIES AND DIVERSITIES
ulation and co-operating amicably with it, while at the same
time preserving the characteristics which distinguish them
from the majority, and satisfying the ensuing special needs.
In order to attain this object, two things were regarded as
particularly necessary, and have formed the subject of provi-
sions in these treaties.
The first is to ensure that nationals belonging to racial,
religious or linguistic minorities shall be placed in every re-
spect on a footing of perfect equality with the other nationals
of the State.
The second is to ensure for the minority elements suitable
means for the preservation of their racial peculiarities, their
traditions and their national characteristics.
These two requirements are indeed closely interlocked,
for there would be no true equality between a majority and a
minority if the latter were deprived of its own institutions, and
were consequently compelled to renounce that which consti-
tutes the very essence of its being as a minority.117
A dissenting opinion urged that the state interest had to have
equal weight. In interpreting the treaty, the dissent said:
[T]he question whether the possession of particular institu-
tions may or may not be important to the minority cannot
constitute the decisive consideration. There is another consid-
eration entitled to equal weight. That is the extent to which
the monopoly of education may be of importance to the State.
The two considerations cannot be weighed one against the
other: Neither of them - in the absence of a clear stipulation
to that effect - can provide an objective standard for deter-
mining which of them is to prevail.
International justice must proceed upon the footing of ap-
plying treaty stipulations impartially to the rights of the State
and to the rights of the minority, and the method of doing so
is to adhere to the terms of the treaty - as representing the
common will of the parties - as closely as possible.t 8
As Schwebel notes, from the point of view of modern human
rights, this opinion involves what is today called affirmative action.' 9 It
117. Advisory Opinion No. 49, supra note 108, at 496.
118. Id. at 504-05.
119. Stephen M. Schwebel, Human Rights in the World Court, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
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also echoes, more obviously in the European than in the American con-
text perhaps, the older system of estates and privileges in a world in
which groups and status dominated the political structure. 2 ° And it is
possible to see the Treaties as raising issues for the republican or demo-
cratic state, particularly in its modern unified form. But it is also possi-
ble to see that modern states had sometimes adopted the view taken by
the Treaties. Thus Clemenceau urged that "[t]he educational provi-
sions contain nothing beyond what is in fact provided in the educational
institutions of many highly organized modern States." '121 He believed
that "[t]here is nothing inconsistent with the sovereignty of the State in
recognising and supporting schools in which children shall be brought
up in the religious influences to which they are accustomed in their
home." '122 And as to language, he thought that "[a]mple safeguards
against any use of non-Polish languages to encourage a spirit of na-
tional separation have been provided in the express acknowledgment
that the provisions of this Treaty do not prevent the Polish State from
making the Polish language obligatory in all its schools and educational
institutions. 123
In fact, the precise delineation of control over the schools by the
state was not accomplished in the Treaties. Jacob Robinson and his
associates cited a number of questions left open and particularly the
issue of state control over the minority schools:
The portions of the Treaties granting the minorities the right
to establish, manage and control their own educational estab-
lishments also provoked many other questions. "Was the gov-
ernment free to prohibit or to close private minorities schools
and associations?" "Was the state entitled to supervise such
institutions?" "What was the relationship between those who
established such schools and the state authorities, and what
were the rights of the schools?" "In their schools and other
institutions the minorities could use their language, but what
945, 951 (1991).
120. See R. R. PALMER. THE WORLD OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1971), for a description
of privileges in Europe.
121. Letter from Clemenceau to M. Paderewski (June 24, 1919) in TEMPERLEY, supra note
36, at 436.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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was the extent of the right?" "Were the teachers obliged to
know the State language?" '124
The approach of the Treaties to public support of minority educa-
tion could raise a number of questions. 25 Americans, while of course
they were not obligated to do anything under the Treaties, might have
noted that in the United States there are objections, and constitutional
problems, with public funding for sectarian schools, and in some
quarters opposition to funding for any sort of private school.126 And
Clemenceau's reference to the children learning only that which they
are taught in their homes anticipates an emphasis the United Nations
documents, as well as the focus of those who view the educational is-
sues for a society as very close to family autonomy issues. 1"7
The strongest statement of the danger posed by the radical decen-
tralization possible under any of these international guarantees (either
the limited approach of the Treaties or the broader family autonomy
concepts in the later statements) is perhaps found in Homer's descrip-
tion of the social order of the Cyclops, who had "no muster and no
meeting, no consultation or old tribal ways, but each one dwells in his
own mountain cave dealing out rough justice to wife and child, indiffer-
ent to what others do."' 28 But this particular danger seems remote in
our present context, in which the greater threat seems to come from the
powerful centers, governmental and non-governmental, of mass-socie-
ties. The idea that the state has a responsibility to make room for and
124. ROBINSON. ET AL., supra note 1, at 68.
125. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
126. Although of course private schools have been very important in the United States. The
history of intentional communities, as well as the history of psychological movements, reveals an
interest in private education which is essentially derived from a communal underlay which relates
the issue of sub-groups and minorities to the issue of private education. See, for example, the
discussion of educational radicalism in the chapter on the Ferrer Colony and the Modern School
in LAURENCE VEYSEY, THE COMMUNAL EXPERIENCE: ANARCHIST AND MYSTICAL COMMUNITIES IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 77-177 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1978)(1973).
127. The family is often viewed as a unity. Of course it is not. For one attempt at disaggrega-
tion, see Carol Weisbrod, Family Governance: A Reading of Kafka's Letter to His Father, 24
ToLEDO L. REV. (forthcoming 1993). On entity and aggregation in the family, see Lee E. Teitel-
baum, Intergenerational Responsibility and Family Obligation: On Sharing, 1992 UTAH L REV.
765 (discussing the continuing importance of the family). See also Stephen J. Roth, Toward a
Minority Convention: Its Need and Content, 20 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 93 (1990). "For many minor-
ities the family forms the nuclear group unit for their existence; the protection of the family is
therefore of existential importance to minorities, just as the rights of the child are vital assurance
of their continuity." Id. at 109.
128. HOMER. TIlE ODYSSEY, bk. 9, I1. 120-24 [p. 148] (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Vintage Clas-
sics ed. 1990)(1961).
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even assist minority schools is central to the approach of the League of
Nations, and has a parallel, (with a significant difference on the issue
of subsidy) in American law.
C. The American Experience
An aspect of American exceptionalism has also to do with its ap-
proach to the issue of minorities.
In theory, the American system was uniquely designed to pro-
vide a social and political framework in which differences of
race and culture could be maintained and enhanced according
to their own genius and vitality at the same time that all indi-
vidual members of the society are fused into a political and
social system that assures equality of status and a decent mea-
sure of common belongingness and self-esteem to all.' 29
But all this, Harold lsaacs comments, is "a tall, tall order.'
30
The present American conversation raises problems similar to
those discussed earlier. A basic illustration in the discussion of freedom
of association is about discrimination on the basis of race, against a
background of slavery and racism. The discussion of Native American
claims typically begins with the narrative of the treatment of Native
Americans by the "courts of the conqueror."' 13' The idea is that talking
about the issue without the group history conceals rather than illumi-
nates the problem. (And perhaps it is not necessary to resolve the ques-
tion whether genocide 32 is based on a group right - the right to group
survival - or on an individual right - the right not to be murdered
because of a group affiliation.) But often the American discussion con-
cerns education.
The International Court of Justice case on the minority schools in
Albania was curiously parallel to Pierce v. Society of Sisters,' Ameri-
can litigation of about a decade earlier, which, on the basis of princi-
129. HAROLD R. ISAACS, IDOLS OF THE TRIBE: GROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE 214
(Harvard Univ. Press 1989)(1975).
130. Id.
131. See Justice Marshall's opinion in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588
(1823). See generally Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 1.
132. Lemkin's discussion of genocide included various kinds of genocide, including at least one
which raises diflicult questions. That is the "'moral debasement" of a population through, for ex-
ample, exposure to pornography. RAPHAEL LEMKIN. AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 90 (1944).
133. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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ples peculiar to American constitutional law, reached a result similar to
that reached by the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Before reaching that, however, a general comment of the relation
of the approach of the Minorities Treaties to the American scheme
may be in order, and the comments of one contemporary academic ob-
server may serve as illustrative. Arthur Scott, Assistant Professor at
the University of Chicago in 1920, attempted to explain why certain
approaches were properly imposed on Eastern Europe but would not be
proper in the United States. The minorities in America, he said, came
voluntarily, presumably knowing what our institutions are and by im-
plication accepting them. "If they find them unsatisfactory, they may
go elsewhere."'3 4 By contrast, in central Europe, "the minorities are in
few instances recent and voluntary immigrants. ' 135 Rather, they are
people "settled in their districts for centuries," many "detached from
the main body of their fellows by political events which they could not
control." ' Many of them, Scott wrote, "are given a citizenship which
they do not desire." '137 For these reasons, "to reconcile them to the situ-
ation, it is necessary, as a measure of practical statesmanship, to grant
them privileges which are entirely unnecessary in the United States.' 1 38
134. ARTHUR PEARSON SCOTT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PEACE TREATIES 206 (1920). Of
course the omission here of the history of Native Americans or the institution of slavery not only
distorts the American experience but also makes comprehensible the grievance one might attri-
bute, for example, to the Roumanians, who could easily have said that one state which had abol-
ished slavery only in the nineteenth century (Roumania enslaved the gypsies until 1848 and re-
fused civil rights to Jews much later) was being dictated to by another state (The United States),
which had only abolished slavery in the middle of the nineteenth century, and had a somewhat
problematic record on civil rights for Jews and Catholics through the nineteenth century which
continued into the twentieth century. See MORTON BORDEN. JEWS. TURKS AND INFIDELS (1984).
135. SCOTT, supra note 134, at 206.
136. Id.
137. Id. The Coles suggest unqualifiedly that the First World War resulted in states having
minority populations with "no loyalty" to the larger state. G. D. H COLE & MARGARET COLE. A
GUIDE TO MODERN POLITICS 32 (1934).
138. SCOTT, supra note 134, at 206. Scott included a discussion of the Jewish minority in
Poland, noting that Sunday closing laws were not forbidden by the Treaties, and also were to be
found in a number of American states. Id. at 207.
Jewish organizations were represented at the peace conferences by a number of delegations
from various countries, among them the United States. See generally OSCAR I. JANOWSKY. THE
JEWS AND MINORITY RIGHTS (1898-1919) (AMS Press 1966)(1933). Louis Marshall was a
leader of these groups. Defending the Minorities Treaties, he rejected the idea that the Treaties
were based on the idea of segregation:
When the Peace Conference convened in 1919 at Paris, it was recognized by President
Wilson and other forward-looking statesmen that it would be essential in connection with
the Treaty of Peace to protect racial, linguistic and religious minorities in the newly
constituted countries and in those with which treaties of peace were to be consummated.
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In fact the treaty provisions relating to education were not identi-
cal to American law on the subject of private education and in fact, in
one respect they were opposed to that law. Thus, as Arthur Scott
pointed out in his Introduction to the Peace Treaties, the United States
did not permit public funding of religious education. "While we permit
any privately supported school, notably the Roman Catholic parochial
system, to teach any religion, in any language, we are opposed on prin-
ciple to giving them any support from public funds."1"9 ("Any" is per-
haps too strong, but certainly the history of the parochial school fund-
ing issue over several decades indicates strong sensitivity on the
question.)
On the language issue, the American position was (and continues
to be) ambiguous. Scott in 1920 saw that while "[i]n some country
districts a considerable part of the instruction in the elementary public
schools was given in some other language than English," and when this
fact came out during the war, "it was regarded with distinct disfa-
vor."' 4 ° The American point of view, Scott wrote with assurance "is
that we do not want permanent communities in this country that are
not able and willing to speak our language."' 141
The American discussion, perhaps not surprisingly, is focused on
religious groups as much as ethnic or linguistic groups, particularly
when the focus is normative diversity. 42 Ethnicity itself may not have
the role in the AMherican setting that it has had in Europe (although
race has, perhaps, had more importance in the United States) and
tastes in food and music have not raised the sort of issues for the state
that have been raised by the marriage and divorce regulations of differ-
ent religions. Further emphasis on religious groups is made necessary
by the particular American constitutional structure, which has chan-
neled the discussion into a constitutional debate over the meaning of
the religious liberty guarantees of the First Amendment. Issues may be
The prevailing idea was that there should be assured equal rights to all men in all lands.
Those rights were to be the same as are conferred by the Constitution of the United
States upon all persons dwelling within our land.
Letter from Louis Marshall to the Editor of the American Israelite (Aug. 23, 1926) in 2 LOuiS
MARSHALL. CHAMPION OF LIBERTY supra note 55, at 577-78 (emphasis added).
Marshall contributed the amicus brief for the American Jewish Committee supporting the
position of the private schools in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.
139. SCOTT, supra note 134, at 205.
140. Id. at 205-06.
141. Id. at 206.
142. See Philip Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate About
Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights (1992 Sup. CT. REv. 295).
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cast as religious issues exactly because individual conscience or tribal
custom or ethnic tradition do not provide the basis for a free exercise
defense.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters'43 is a leading case on free exercise
issues and it involves a Roman Catholic school and a military academy.
Pierce can be understood as a critical case in.the history of American
pluralism, as essential for the possibility of multiple systems as Rey-
nolds v. United States,' " the Mormon polygamy case, is for the idea of
common values. Pierce stands for the proposition that the state does not
own children, and that the state cannot have a monopoly in the educa-
tion of children. Pierce makes room for alternative educational systems
within the state, and by extension for multiple communities within the
state.
The Pierce Court wrote:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature
of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional obligations. 45
The state's argument in Pierce was similar to the argument of the
dissent in the case on minority schools in Albania to the extent that it
stressed first that a substantial state interest was involved, and second
that the particular state interest was in effect patriotic universalism.
If the governments of the several states have no power to pro-
vide for the education of the children within its limits, and if
the character of the education of such children is to be en-
tirely dictated by the parents of such children, or by those per-
sons by whose influence the parents are controlled, it is hard
to assign any limits to the injurious effect, from the standpoint
of American patriotism which may result.'46
A pamphlet quoted in an amicus brief offered some detail:
143. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
144. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
145. 268 U.S. at 535. The Hill Military Academy was a private school for boys.
146. Appellant's Brief at 62, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(No. 583)(No.
584).
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Our children must not under any pretext, be it based
upon money, creed or social status, be divided into antagonis-
tic groups, cliques, or cults there to absorb the narrow views
of life as they are taught.47
The Pierce case is understood by American constitutional lawyers
to have in its most technical readings not much to do with American
understandings of First Amendment rights.' 48 The issue was ruled upon
before the general understanding that the First Amendment, with its
guarantees of religious liberty, bound the separate states as well as the
federal government. Nonetheless, despite its technical irrelevance, the
case has a clear role in constitutional development. Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, in protecting the existence of religious education and non-state
education in general, is widely understood as a powerful statement of
group rights against the intrusion of state authorities.
The images of totalitarianism which are invoked by the Supreme
Court in Pierce make plain that the limits on state authority are under-
stood broadly. From the point of view of a pluralist structure, the criti-
cal participant in the Pierce case is perhaps the Hill Military Academy,
precisely because it was not a religious institution and was not pro-
tected, and would not now be, by the First Amendment's free exercise
clause. Further, the military academy, with all of the associations
which can be brought to military structures and training, is precisely
the example of the educational institution which was not open, not ex-
perimental and not focused on individual autonomy. At least as we can
imagine it, it is the secular analogue of the religious fundamentalist
school involved in some current American litigation. Pierce allows
schools of quite different character to exist within a state-authorized
school system.
The Minorities Treaties, for entirely understandable reasons, fo-
147. The pamphlet is quoted in the Brief of Louis Marshall, Amicus Curiae, On Behalf of
Appellees. at 16, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (No. 583) (No. 584) (emphasis
added).
148. Justice Black wrote of the technical holding in Pierce:
Mr. Justice McReynolds said that a state law requiring that all children attend public
schools interfered unconstitutionally with the property rights of private school corpora-
tions because it was an "'arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference" which
threatened "destruction of their business and property." 268 U.S., at 536. Without ex-
pressing an opinion as to whether either of those cases reached a correct result in light of
our later decisions applying the First Amendment to the States through the Fourteenth, I
merely point out that the reasoning stated in Meyer and Pierce was the same natural law
due process philosophy which many later opinions repudiated, and which I cannot accept.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 516 (1965)(Black, J., dissenting)(citation omitted).
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cused on groups limited to the familiar categories, categories created
by the historical conditions under which they were developed. But the
possible groups which might be entitled to the positive support of the
state are highly various. Bell's list149 ranges from groups based on occu-
pations, to age, to sexual orientation. Each of these might want (and be
entitled to) schools, and even under some systems, public support for
schools.150 Each might at least for a time, constitute a social context for
associated individuals and some might be judged (by someone) to be
better than others. "[E]specially in the case of very small linguistic
groups and in the case of obscurantist religious groups," Van Dyke
writes, "to assure a right of group survival is to restrict the opportuni-
ties of individual members for full self-realization. Assimilation, involv-
ing the disappearance of the group, is sometimes desirable." 15
One question, then, is what range of private (meaning non-state)
institutional life should be encouraged, or even tolerated. Another dis-
cussion focuses on the educational policy of the central state.1 52 In the
context of education, one might say that this requires a system of
vouchers given to parents of children who want to attend any school for
any reason, subject to state regulation of minimum content (a point for
exploration). Or one might want to say that state funding is required
for state schools only (what does the state school teach about which
149. See supra note 75.
150. The issue of subsidy is complicated by the economic inequalities in particular societies, as
well as by the problem created if the state decides which enterprises to fund (presumably those
which suit state purposes) and it raises issues of free development versus fostered development.
For a recent discussion, see Douglas Sanders, Collective Rights, 13 HuM. RTS. Q 368-86 (1991).
For an earlier discussion, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Internal Affairs of Associations Not For
Profit, 43 HARV. L. REv. 993 (1930).
151. Van Dyke, supra note 45, at 613.
But how is one to know what groups are to be assimilated? Who is to decide this? Isn't this
exactly the power which we do not want the state to have? Certainly American courts, operating
under the constraints of the First Amendment, would have to be cautious about the consequences
of any possible "obscurantism" in a religious group.
152. See GUTMANN, supra note 65, at 64ff (discussing especially arguments against an under-
standing of a minimal state-enforced standard with maximum decentralization of decision-making
authority through ideas of family sovereignty). On family sovereignty, see JOHN E. CoONs &
STEPtEN D. SUGARMAN. EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL (1978).
Laponce, in The Protection of Minorities, distinguishes generally between minorities by force
and minorities by will, and suggests that certain latitudes ought to be allowed minorities by will in
the area of education. He sees the central problem of the Doukhobors as that of whether the
government can tolerate a certain number of uneducated children. This, however, misses the issue
of the claims of the children as citizens (members of the state) or the claim of the state to protect
the rights of children even when they do not assert those rights. J. A LAPONCE, THE PROTECTION
OF MINORITIES 181 (1960). See Justice Douglas' opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
240 (1972).
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groups?) but individuals who can afford them can send their children
to private schools.' z
Once we get an image of the chaotic array of educational options,
run by a theoretically unlimited number of groups, the question of the
center re-emerges powerfully. What is holding all of this together?
Some in the United States have been concerned with symbolic an-
swers to this question." Others are concerned with the problem of
minimal educational content, 1 55 and controversies continue to arise as
to the substance of public education in the United States.
The difficulties in this area have been well understood for some
time and the tensions between the goals of the various entities involved
have been clear to those advocating the importance of group life and
institutions. The point here is that education has been seen as the
proper focus of the discussion. Thus it was- said in 1920: "The educa-
tional process alone is the instrumentality properly responsible in a de-
mocracy for maintaining the national identity of minority
communities."' 56
153. The focus here has been on education because it is so central for group life. Related
issues concern group libel, treated in the American literature in the 1950s and again a subject.
See Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech. Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of
Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REv. 103 (1992).
154. See a re-working of the language of the pledge in George P. Fletcher, Update the Pledge,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, § 4, at 19.
155. One aspect of the parental choice solution advanced by Coons & Sugarman, supra note
152, is perhaps most cleaily addressed in detail by E. D. Hirsch. E. D. HIRSCH. JR.. CULTURAL
LITERACY: WHAT E\'ERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW (rev. ed. 1988); E. D. HIRSCH. JR. ET AL..
THE DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW (1988);
E. D. HIRSCH. JR.. A FIRST DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT OUR CHILDREN NEED
TO KNOW (1991).
While the minimal content of an educational program might be debated, one can usefully
recall the language of Justice McReynolds writing for the Court in Pierce:
.No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools,
to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character
and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be
taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
There is an argument that even the most minimalist state-sponsored education - or even the
communication and interaction focused proposals of E. D. Hirsch - contain normative judgments
and require agreement among those who generally do not agree. Undoubtedly they do, but some
of this is perhaps usefully seen as normative in the same sense that the teaching of language to
infants normatively judges language to be better than no language, and the mother-tongue to be
better than others not (yet) taught. The basic point here is that minimalist goals are different
from maximalist goals, and that agreements on minimum frameworks might be possible where
agreements on the good life might not be.
156. ISAAC BERKSON. TllEORIES OF AMI-RICANIZATION: A CRITICAL STUDY 147 (Arno Press
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Because that minimal ordering which makes peace possible had to
include some sort of education, the discussion in the United States has
focused very explicitly on the issues of education in a world of conflict-
ing values and cultures. Some of the discussion has been by representa-
tives of groups which have insisted that the public narrative include
some telling of their story. 157 The Minorities Treaties approached the
enterprise by protecting minority schools and also insisting, for exam-
ple, on the right of the central state to teach the national language as
part of the basic state program. Many today do the same. The educa-
tional arena continues to be a critical forum for the pluralist conversa-
tion. It is in this area that we find thinking about voucher plans, decen-
tralization of educational authority, and a multiplicity of approaches to
the subject matter itself. Pluralist ideas provide one way to cut through
the grammar of epithets in which, as Gellner suggests, "I am a patriot,
you are a nationalist and he is a tribalist."'1 58 Thus the historian John
Higham has noted that "pluralism in all its forms is a philosophy of
minority rights."' 59
The current United Nations documents do not limit the rights of
parents to issues of education organized on a religious basis.16 0 They
& The N.Y. Times 1969)(1920). This is because
In]either local segregation nor governmental separatism would allow the undisturbed in-
terchange of social forces which democracy demands. On the other hand communal or-
ganization with the school as the centre would make it possible to continue the ethnic
loyalty and to preserve the cultural and spiritual personality of the group without of
necessity interfering with the free play of currents demanded by the unity of American
life.
Id.
Berkson was thinking largely of supplementary schools.
157. Gypsies are still, for example, working to get their story told. They are also still the
subject of inter-state agreements. Ferdinand Protzman, German, Reaches Deal to Deport
Thousands of Gypsies to Romania, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1992, at 1. See generally on the history
of the gypsies, IAN HANCOCK, THE PARIAH SYNDROME (rev. ed. 1988).
158. ERNST GELLNER. NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 86 (1987).
159. JOHN HIGHAM, SEND THESE TO ME: IMMIGRANTS IN URBAN AMERICA 200 (rev. ed.
1984).
160. For example, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
reads:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 18, I, 999 U.N.T.S
171, 178. See also, infra note 161.
Thornberry comments on the issue of religious education that "[a]ccess to religious education
in accordance with parental wishes implies a duty on the State to remove any obstacles to this, as
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are broader than some of the coverage in the Minorities Treaties. At
the same time, however, they do not much reflect the issues involving
the definitions of parents (in view of the issues raised by new birth
technologies) or family (a subject discussed in law review writing) or
possible limits the state might want to impose on family autonomy,
whether expressed through a formula relating to the best interests of
the child or another formula (common in religious liberty provisions)
relating to public welfare and good morals. And of course the current
guarantee clauses do not much address the possibility of tensions be-
tween various aspirations expressed." t
well as. on a reasonable reading of the paragraph, to provide facilities for such education if the
right of access is to be an effective right." THORNBERRY, supra note 18, at 194, commenting on
Article 5, paragraph 2 of the International Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intol-
erance, infra note 161. Capotorti believes that "the more a religious community lacks resources,
the more the State is bound to take steps to ensure its survival." Capotorti, supra note 49, at 23.
On another point, Krishnaswami thought that religion and belief had to be defined very
broadly. KRISHNASWAMI. supra note 43, at I, n.I. Compare United States discussions on defini-
tions and religion, especially Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
The forms of necessary encouragement would have to be developed. As already noted, the
Treaties viewed the internal minorities as part of the state, entitled even to state funding for their
separate schools including religious schools. This is of course inconsistent with some domestic law,
but we are not concerned here with problems raised by inconsistency with domestic law. Rather,
the suggestion is made that such policies have reasons, history and experience behind them, and
that the international discussion might well consider those reasons before flatly adopting the posi-
tion that funding is a desirable or even necessary component of a human right, or the alternative
position that funding always raises religious liberty issues.
161. Consider the text of Article Five of the International Declaration on the Elimination of
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief:
I. The parents or, as the case may be, the legal guardians of the child have the right to
organize the life within the family in accordance with their religion or belief and bearing
in mind the moral education in which they believe the child should be brought up.
2. Every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion or
belief in accordance with the wishes of his parents or, as the case may be, legal guardi-
ans, and shall not be compelled to receive teaching on religion or belief against the wishes
of his parents or legal guardians, the best interests of the child being the guiding
principle.
3. The child shall be protected from any form of discrimination on the ground of religion
or belief. He shall be brought up in a spirit of understanding, tolerance, friendship among
peoples, peace and universal brotherhood, respect for freedom of religion or belief of
others ....
International Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, Nov. 25, 1981, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. 205, 207 (adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly Jan. 18, 1982, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Agenda item 75).
Compare Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 26, 3, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. I, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (adopted Dec. 10, 1948) ("Parents have a prior right to
choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children."). See generally ELIZABETH
ODIO BINITO. ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF INTOLERANCE AND DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RE-
ILIGION OR BELIEF. SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF
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In theory, non-state education could be organized on the basis of
almost any identification.' 62 The focus would then be on some kind of
minimal regulation, minimal core content and maximal room for com-
plex group life. The world might look like something John Stuart Mill
would have appreciated, in which the state involvement with education
would be limited, as he suggested, to the administration of a national
examination, limited perhaps, as he suggested, to an inquiry into facts
rather than opinions.16 3 The problem as he saw it was the risk of state
power, and so on disputed questions Mill wanted taught only the infor-
mation that some thought x while others thought y."6 4 On this view, a
framework that allows maximal choice for individuals (in their groups)
works best. The home education movement offers a clear illustration of
how small the tribe can finally be."6 5
It is in the educational context that we see an interesting illustra-
tion of a shift from one group to another as the status category. In
1988, Quebec replaced confessional school boards with language based
boards, arguing that this system "would better reflect the province's
religious diversity and natural division on linguistic lines." ' A lawyer
arguing for the Protestant boards noted that the new linguistic boards
would not have the constitutional protections of the old denominational
boards (under the British North America Act) and that "without con-
stitutional protection, they could turn around and replace linguistic
boards with boards for left-handed people or for people who wear
shorts."'6 7 We are at a point in history in Canada in which language
MINORITIES, U.N. Sales No. E.89.XIV.3 (1989).
See on such tensions Jack Greenberg, Race. Sex, and Religious Discrimination in Interna-
tional Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 307, 331
(Theodor Meron ed., 1984).
162. "Almost" is a qualification relating to those problems understood to be opposed to central
and strongly held social norms, whatever they are. But we can imagine - or can't we? - schools
built on race, gender, class, ideology, all required to meet certain standards, including the teaching
of tolerance and respect.
163. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 118ff. (John Gray
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1859).
164. But when is an issue "contested" as against seen as "we know" but "they think."?
165. The question of state and group can equally be pursued through the issue of exemption to
programs within the public schools. It is in the answers provided to these very specific problems
that we get some sense of the ranges of tolerance in particular societies. Consider also the impact
of universal dress codes on sub-groups, for example, in the head dress controversy in France. See
Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE JL. & HuM. 97, 122-26 (1991).
166. Peggy Curran, Protestant Boards say court case is fight for survival, THE GAZETTE
(Montreal), Dec. 8, 1992, at Al.
167. Id.
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difference and religious difference count for public purposes, while
handed-ness and short versus long pants do not. In the United States,
diversity (viewed as desirable) is measured by ethnicity, gender, and
race, more perhaps than by region of residence or birth or by religion,
all of which were once prominent differentials. Sexual orientation is
often viewed as relevant in a context forbidding discrimination, but not
(yet) relevant in a diversity affirmative/action context.
This paper is not intended to outline or endorse any particular
form of educational structure, though many proposals relating to such
forms, and many discussions of such proposals, are available.168 For
some the emphasis will be on the alternatives to public education, for
others the content of a basic public education, often minimal and with
the development of institutions for diverse opportunities for education
undertaken later on. These discussions assume that there will be differ-
ences which remain between people, even after the issues which we in-
tend by such terms as racism, sexism, and discrimination have
disappeared. 69
CONCLUSION: THE LESSONS OF THE TREATIES
It is sometimes suggested that the lessons of the Minorities Trea-
ties have something to do with group rights, and that because the Trea-
ties acknowledged specific groups where the present United Nations
documents generally do not, the Treaties are stronger protections for
minorities. 7 '
This is not the emphasis urged here. First, it is suggested that the
present stance in the U.N. texts may be at least as valuable as the
earlier one because of the broader coverage - to everyone rather than
to specific groups - and because of the recognition of autonomy rights
of families, a prime vehicle for preservation of minority group values of
all kinds.
Second, the strengths of the Treaties are seen not in the references
168. E.g., ROCKNE MCCARTHY ET AL.. SOCIETY. STATE. AND SCHOOLS: A CASE FOR STRUC-
TURAL AND CONFESSIONAL PLURALISM (1981); COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 152; MICHAEL
WALZER. SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 181ff. (1983).
169. An ambiguity in some discussion on this point is of course that we do not know what is
intended to be taught when, for example, we are told, as by Gutmann, that the public schools
should teach tolerance and other democratic values, avoiding racism and sexism. GUTMANN. supra
note 65. at 287.
170. For the approach of the Council of Europe, see Report on Additional Protocol on the
Rights of Minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights, Eur. Par. Ass., Doc. No.
6742 (1993).
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to groups but in the recognition that groups, quasi-autonomous, and
sometimes and to some degree self-regulating, have a relation to the
modern state. This relation might be expressed in the sense of the
Czech treaty regarding the Ruthenians: groups have autonomy to the
degree consistent with state unity. That unity need not of course be
total. Its content is to be explored, and one way to explore it is through
the issues of common education.
The effort here has not been to resolve the issues of a common
standard, or a common educational program, but to avoid the largest
debate over those questions by asserting the need for some sort of
framework within which different world views can survive. One way of
talking about this would be to speak of a highly delineated role for
government, sharply differentiated from "society" which then would
function theoretically independently with a variety of institutions
outside the state, which are allowed to exist as they can and will.' 71
One difficulty with this formulation is that it sees no role for the state
in relation to those non-state institutions. At least in the present envi-
ronment, in the world of the strong national state, some impact on non-
state groups is inevitable and we are obliged to consider the form that
impact takes.
It may be in fact that the claims of whatever largest group exists
have always had considerable weight, even before the appearance of
what we call the modern sovereign state, in part because the largest
could be invoked to assist the smallest. The member of the group also
stands in some.relation to the larger group, and even the most minimal
state can reach outside of its bounded field of concern to the function-
ing of society when the social issue involved is seen as having some
relevance to something within the state province.
A basic model of the relationships is clear in the pattern in which
the state judges the behavior of the group with reference to its own
members. The relation between the state and the internal group is ap-
parent, for example, in a discussion by Hugo Grotius"' the father of
international law, of the rights of the Jewish Community of Amster-
dam. He concluded that while there were certain autonomy rights of
171. One way to conceive this approach is through the public/private distinction. See Richard
S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, The Public-Private Distinction. And the Independence of
Constitutional Law, CO.ST. COMMENTARY (forthcoming, Aug. 1993).
172. On Grotius, see generally Mark Janis, Religion and the Literature of International Law:
Somne Standard Texts, in TIHE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAl. LAw 61 (Mark Janis ed., 1991).
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the community, still the central authority (here the city of Amsterdam)
had the right to review the actions of the internal community, in this
case using the Old Testament as the standard.
A historian of the Dutch Jewish Community has written:
As early as 1615 we find an approving mention of the right of
the Jewish community to excommunicate in paragraph twenty
of the Remonstrantie of Hugo Grotius, where he writes: "The
teacher of the Jews or those who are appointed to that end
among them will have the right to excommunicate and ostra-
cize Jews whose way of life or opinions are evil". However in
that very paragraph he opens the door for the possibility of the
intervention of the Christian authorities. He writes: "Nonethe-
less, anyone who wishes to complain that he was excommuni-
cated even though he was innocent should submit his com-
plaint to the local authorities, who will investigate the matter
and decide according to the laws of the Old Testament". Gro-
tius' proposals were not adopted by the authorities; however
with regard to the herem, there is no doubt that in fact mat-
ters were handled rather closely to the spirit of the Remon-
strant theologian and jurist. The city authorities ratified the
community ordinances and acknowledged its right to exercise
the instrument of excommunication against deviants and
rebels. That right was explicitly acknowledged a number of
times upon various occasions. Notwithstanding, the city mag-
istrates did not refrain from action whenever Jews of the Por-
tuguese community turned to them and complained that they
had been unjustly excommunicated. 17
The precise example, expulsion from a religious group, could of
course come up today, as the general issue might be raised if the ques-
tion involved a practice of any group with reference to its own
members.1 74
173, Yosef Kaplan, The Social Functions of the Hereto in the Portuguese Jewish Comnlunity
of Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century, in DUTCH JEWISH HISTORY II1, 145 (Jozeph
Michman & Tirtsah Levie eds., 1984). See discussion in Salo W. Baron, Newer Approaches to
Jewish Emancipation, 29 DIOGENES 56, 59 (Spring 1960).
174. Thornberry suggests on this point that no individual should, under the various pronounce-
ments of the United Nations be coerced by a group. THORNBERRY. supra note 18. at 205. This
raises quite serious issues concerning the capacity to consent of those socialized within particular
societies.
See reference to issues of female socialization in Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals
in the Struggle Over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1553 (1991).
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The example from Grotius is telling not so much because of its
substance as its source. It reinforces the continuities between the do-
mestic and the international questions.
Stated negatively, the relation between the state and the group, or
the world order and the state and the group is one of control and super-
vision. But positively, the idea would be that one of the enterprises of
the modern state is to foster the growth of societal forms. The state
should encourage diversities and differences just as in the world of the
Minorities Treaties the state was supposed to support the educational
institutions of the minority groups and in the world of the United Na-
tions documents the state is generally supposed to encourage many
forms of associational life.
The Treaties of course drew on their own history, a history of
group experience both of accommodation and of persecution. The Trea-
ties were informed also by the critical necessity of solving a problem.
The particular minorities the Treaties considered were in fact there,
people who even if they stayed in their own homes, on their own land,
could be from one day to another, part of different nation-states.'75 In
this sense, the Minorities Treaties were simply dealing with facts, facts
which had been historically associated with war. But perhaps also the
Treaties can be used as a model of some other possibilities.
The present inquiry was historically located at the period just after
the First World War, and used material from the efforts of the League
of Nations to deal with questions of minority rights. But the more gen-
eral issues raised in Part I are in no way limited to either historical
issues or to the forum of the international organization. Rather, Part I
was offered as a discussion of the most general issues of frameworks for
difference, suggesting that the two basic but distinguishable problems
are membership and which groups count, when the issue is confronted
by specific authorities.'76 These specific authorities may not at all
agree, any more than the specific nation-states agree on the interna-
tional norm. Indeed, this issue of fundamental disagreement is now as
it has always been one of the most basic facts of the situation.' 77 Part
Issues of consent and socialization only get us back to the education question.
175. See example of a man whose affiliation changed while his home did not, in Engelberg,
supra note 6, at A3.
176. Here, there seems sometimes to be inadequate recognition of the point that there are
multiple authorities outside the state-system.
177. On cultural relativism and normative pluralism, see FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSB-
RODT. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW. POLICY. AND PROCESS 333-53 (1990). It is possible
to use examples like female circumcision to demonstrate cultural relativism and normative plural-
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I1 focused on education, as people often have, because of its central
importance in considering politics and international peace. In the end,
and with an awareness of at least some of the issues involved, perhaps
one can simply quote, as an international objective, The Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights:
Education shall be directed to the full development of the
human personality and to the strengthening of respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote un-
derstanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial
or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the
United Nations for the maintenance of peace." 's
ism, this example perhaps comforting because the practice seems remote, safely alien, and under
attack, especially in the West. See Marlise Simons, France Jails Woman for Daughters' Circum-
cisions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. I1, 1992 (on jailing in France of mothers who performed operation on
daughters). Consider also, however, the discussion of the right to change one's religion, an issue
affecting much larger groups. See Bastanipour v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 980 F.2d
1129 (7th Cir. 1992)(involving a Muslim convert to Christianity who feared persecution if re-
turned to Iran). See also Jaap A. Walkate, The U.N. Declaration on the elimination of all forms
of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief (1981) - an historical overview, I
CONSCIENCE & LIBERTY 21 (1989). Compare issues in drafting of Vienna Convention on the
International Sale of Goods, in which linguistic compromises sometimes conceal unresolved ques-
tions relating to legal problems. See Arthur Rosette, Critical Reflections on the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265 (1984). See
also Gyula Edrsi, A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 333, 346 (1983).
On the development of international law from something involving an understanding between
Christian nations, then civilized nations, then peace-loving nations, see DR. B. V. A. ROLING. IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED WORLD (1960).
178. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 161, art. 26, 2. Pauley v. Kelly,
255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979), cites the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), "which
appears to proclaim education to be a fundamental right of everyone, at least on this planet." Id.
at 864. The qualification simply raises the same issues to another level.
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